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Wherever one looks, many elements conspire to suggest that the Democratic Republic 
of Congo should have collapsed some time ago under the multiple assaults of its own 
inadequacies as a state, the extreme heterogeneity and polarization of its populations, 
and the dislocations of globalization and foreign occupation.  Yet, Congo has gone on 
defying such expectations and has continued to display a stunning propensity for 
resilience.  This paper tries to explain why Congo persists amid these overwhelming 
structural obstacles.  It focuses particularly on the more recent period when state 
weakness, foreign invasions, the exploitation of its natural resources by transnational 
and informal networks, and the multiplicity of domestic rebellions linked to foreign 
interests have not managed to dent, however slightly, the generalized support that 
exists for the reproduction of the Congolese state among its elites and regular 
citizens, foreign political and economic interests, and the international community at 
large.  Observing that, in many parts of Congo, local grievances against the state and 
the greed of political elites have been magnified by the circumstances of post-Cold 
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Why Congo Persists:  Globalization, Sovereignty and the Violent 
Reproduction of a Weak State
1 
 
1.  A Multifaceted Paradox 
Wherever one looks, many elements conspire to suggest that the Democratic Republic 
of Congo should have collapsed some time ago under the multiple assaults of its own 
inadequacies as a state, the extreme heterogeneity and polarization of its populations, 
and the dislocations of globalization and foreign occupation.  Yet, Congo has gone on 
defying such expectations and has continued to display a stunning propensity for 
resilience.  This paper tries to explain why Congo persists amid these overwhelming 
structural obstacles.  It focuses particularly on the more recent period when state 
weakness, foreign invasions, the exploitation of its natural resources by transnational 
and informal networks, and the multiplicity of domestic rebellions linked to foreign 
interests have not managed to dent, however slightly, the generalized support that 
exists for the reproduction of the Congolese state among its elites and regular citizens, 
foreign political and economic interests, and the international community at large.  
Observing that, in many parts of Congo, local grievances against the state and the 
greed of political elites have been magnified by the circumstances of post-Cold War 
Africa, it takes as paradoxical the continued broadly unchallenged existence of 
Congo.
2 
  Precious little is indeed redeeming about the state in Congo.  Created as the 
institutional façade of a foreign enterprise of exploitation of ivory and rubber, it 
reproduced as the instrument of an extractive colonization system, in turns violent and 
paternalistic.  Once independent, it provided the stage and the reason for five years of 
sheer chaos combining mutinies, secessions, rebellions, coups and a botched UN 
intervention, then to 32 years of stifling arbitrary rule, predation and eventual 
economic ruin.  “Liberation” from the Mobutu regime only compounded the existing 
arbitrariness and poverty with renewed armed conflict, the collapse of the central 
administrative apparatus and the marginalization of civil society.   Meanwhile, the 
Congolese have never had a chance to freely choose their leaders or political system. 
  The catastrophic failure of the Congolese state as an instrument of collective 
action is further compounded by the vast heterogeneity of its people and their intense 
and frequently violent polarization along regional, ethnic and parochial lines.  By one 
count, Congo has fourteen pre-colonial cultural identity zones and no less than 365 
                                                 
1 Although my argument significantly departs from theirs, the title of this chapter refers to the classic 
paper of Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg.  “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist:  The Empirical 
and the Juridical in Statehood, World Politics, 35(1), October 1982, 1-24.  I owe much gratitude to 
many people who have facilitated my work on this project.  I am aware, however, that some of the 
arguments in this paper could be construed as provocative and even offensive by some in Congo, 
although this never was my intention and I would regret it.  While none of the individuals who have 
helped me bears any responsibility for the substance of my work---and some may well be in complete 
disagreement with it---, I have chosen to refrain from nominally thanking those who have helped me in 
Congo.  They know who they are, and may they know how truly grateful I am for all they have done 
for me.  Outside Congo, my thanks first go to Rebecca Hummel and Stacy Tarango for their superb 
research and editorial assistance, and to Morten Boas, Paule Bouvier, Mauro de Lorenzo, Kate 
Farnsworth, Jan Gorus, Raufu Mustapha, William Reno, Alice Sindzingre, Richard Sklar, Theodore 
Trefon, Denis Tull, Herbert Weiss, and the members of the Working Group on African Political 
Economy. 
2 See the chapter by Frances Stewart in this book for a discussion of the possible impacts of 
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ethnic groups.
3  Some are fiercely antagonistic like the Lunda and Balubakat of 
Katanga, the Lulua and Luba of Kasai, the Hema and Lendu of the Oriental Province, 
or the Banyarwanda and most other groups from Kivu.  Overlapping and cross-cutting 
ethnicity, the Congolese have also developed strong provincial identities.  Katangans 
and Kasaians have long-lasting grievances vis-à-vis each other and the state.  Both 
regions seceded in the 1960s and both experimented with autonomous policies in the 
early 1990s.  The Kivu provinces are also intensely particularistic.  Furthermore, in 
each province, the Congolese tend to make a strong distinction between 
“autochthonous” and “non-autochthonous” populations based on the alleged 
precedence of their settlement there.  Finally, the geographical distribution of 
Congolese populations concentrates around boundary zones, making Congo akin to a 
periphery with no core.
4 
  Compounding these pre-existing structural weaknesses, Congo’s territorial and 
economic integrity has come under the repeated assaults of foreign invasions and the 
informalization of international trade and investment networks over the last decade.  
Twice since 1996, Rwanda and Uganda have invaded Congo and set up or encouraged 
localized rebellions against the state.  At least in the case of Rwanda, there were each 
time substantial (though not unamibiguous) cultural and ethnic connections between 
the Congolese rebels and their foreign patrons, spreading fears that irredentist claims 
would eventually prevail in the Kivu regions.
5  Before 1996 already, the Kivu regions 
had begun dissociating from the state.  In the early 1990s, Denis Tull writes, the 
Kivus were drifting away, "culturally and economically as much part of East Africa," 
and were witnessing the "emergence of vibrant border-crossing informal economic 
networks."
6  Nowadays, “nearly all consumer items available in eastern Congo come 
from Rwanda and especially Uganda” and there is “widespread circulation of 
Ugandan and Rwandan currency along Congo's eastern borders."
7  The Congolese 
Franc’s exchange rate differs also between Kinshasa and the east, where post-1998 
banknotes are not in circulation, reducing monetary supply and appreciating the franc.  
The telephone switchboard for Kisangani is Somalia's.  In Goma, one has to dial 
Rwanda, and cell phones from Kinshasa have to be replaced with Rwandacel 
receivers.  Cars with right-hand steering wheels, imported from the Middle East via 
Uganda are very common in the Kivus. 
  Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe have also occupied large segments of the 
country since 1998, albeit formally on behalf of the Kinshasa government.  
Nevertheless, Zimbabwe at least has attempted to reorient the economies of the Kasai 
and Katanga provinces, which it controlled, in favor of Zimbabwean interests and 
                                                 
3 Isidore Ndaywel è Nziem.  Histoire générale du Congo: De l’héritage ancien à la République 
Démocratique.  Paris: Duculot, 1998,  256-7. 
4 See Jeffrey Herbst.  States and Power in Africa:  Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. 
Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 2000, 148. 
5 For an example of such accusations, see the interview of former US Assistant-Secretary of State 
Herman Cohen, who now lobbies for the Kinshasa government, to the Congolese periodical 
Congopolis in which he stated “I believe that one of the politico-strategic objectives of Kigali has been 
and continues to be the dismemberment of Congo.  The principal objective is to create an indepdent 
state of Kivu which would be governed by substitutes of Kigali and which would become an engine of 
Rwanda’s economic development” (www.digitalcongo.net, 21 October 2002). 
6 Denis Tull. 2001.  “The Dynamics …”, 2. 
7 Denis Tull. 2001.  “The Dynamics …” .  There is no truth, however, to the occasionally heard claims 
that Rwanda has imposed its own currency in the Kivus.  Rather, it allowed trading in Rwandan francs 
as a reulst of the currency cruch brought about by speculators hoarding Congolese francs in the hope of 
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towards Southern African markets in general.
8  This has compounded an already 
developing reorientation of Kasaian and Katangan economic activities away from 
Kinshasa and towards Southern Africa.  According to Michael Nest, for example, 
Kasai became dependent upon Katanga for its trade and Katanga became 
“overwhelmingly reliant on transport networks from the south” in the 1990s.
9  
Simultaneously, and not unrelated, the diminished control of the state over its 
resources and borders has favored the informalization, criminalization, and 
internationalization of the exploitation of Congo’s massive natural wealth, mainly 
composed of diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt, uranium, timber and coltan.  In other 
words, Congo has been penetrated by global networks that operate by and large in the 
margins of the law and bypass existing state structures.
10 
  The failures of the Congolese state, the acute polarization of its society and the 
poundings of globalization make Congo a prime candidate for violent dislocation and 
reconfiguration at the hands of “self-determination movements,” whether driven by 
communal grievances or individual profit motivations.
11  After all, if the Southern 
Sudanese have fought for decades to escape the exploitative domination of their state, 
why wouldn’t the Katangans?  If ethnically homogeneous Somalia has broken down, 
why wouldn’t the more numerous pieces of the Congolese puzzle come undone?  And 
if transnational identities and economic flows have facilitated movements against the 
state in Sri Lanka, Indonesia or Algeria, why would they not yield similar results in 
Congo?  Many observers had indeed predicted the breakdown of Congo as Mobutu’s 
regime crumbled in 1996, based partly on the relatively lively separatist traditions of 
Katanga, the Kasais and the Kivus.  It was not unreasonable to expect then as now 
that the simmering contradictions of the Congolese state, which had been kept under 
lid by the perceived imperatives of the Cold War, would finally boil over as 
international norms of sovereignty came under attack, and as new material conditions 
began to undermine principles of territoriality.
12 
  And yet, Congo endures.  For sure, the Congolese state has been under duress 
for several years, but it has also been virtually free of any “self-determination” 
challenge since the collapse of the Mobutu regime in 1996, in the sense of rebellion 
movements claiming either to break away from the state or to fundamentally change 
its nature.  Nor have occupying forces, Rwanda included, attempted to dismember it.  
On the contrary, all countries at war in Congo formally proclaimed their attachment to 
its territorial integrity in the Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement of 1999 and on several 
other occasions.  Foreign companies have by and large stayed away from the rebels, 
preferring to work with the government in Kinshasa.  And Western governments and 
international organizations have continued to prop up the state, diplomatically and 
                                                 
8 For the role of Zimbabwean military-based trade networks in Congo, see Global Witness.  Branching 
Out:  Zimbabwe’s Resource Colonialismin Democratic Republic of Congo.  London:  Global Witness, 
February 2002, and Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo.  New York:  United 
Nations Security Council, S/2002/1146, 16 October 2002. 
9 Michael Nest.  2001. "Ambitions, Profits and Loss:  Zimbabwean Economic Involvement in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo." African Affairs 100:479. 
10 See the UN’s Final Report…, op.cit., and the transcripts of the ongoing Great Lakes Commission of 
Enquiry of the Senate of Belgium (www.senat.be). See also IPIS “Supporting the War Economy in the 
DRC : European Companies and the Coltan Trade. Five Case Studies,” January 2002. 
11 See Michael L. Ross.  “Oil, Drugs and Diamonds:  How Do Natural Resources Vary in their Impact 
on Vicil War?”, unpublished manuscript; and Richard Snyder.  “Does Lootable Wealth Breed 
Disorder?  States, Regimes and the Political Economy of Extraction”, unpublished manuscript.  
12 On the systematic rescuing of the Congolese/Zairean state by its Western partners during the Cold 
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financially, discouraging alternative institutional solutions (in contrast to their policies 
in the wake of the failure of the Soviet or Yugoslav systems in the 1990s).   
  Not only does Congo endure against all odds, but the Congolese even profess 
a remarkable fervor in their attachment to the state.  Paradoxically, where one would 
expect to observe the formation or the rise to salience of alternative identities, one 
sees a nearly unanimous profession of loyalty to decrepit Congo, whether among 
government supporters, rebels or other opposition groups.  At a January 2002 meeting 
of Congolese president Joseph Kabila and rebel leaders Jean-Pierre Bemba 
(Mouvement de Libération du Congo) and Adolphe Onusumba (Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma), for example, the three factional leaders 
responsible for the partition of the country all “reaffirmed their will to see [Congo] 
recover its unity.”
13  A few months later, explaining his (later recused) agreement to 
set up a transitional government with Bemba as Prime Minister, Kabila declared “we 
have been able to get along on a [shared] nationalistic [and] patriotic basis that takes 
account of the superior interests of the nation.”
14  Back in January 2002, leaders of 
non-armed political parties and of the self-proclaimed civil society, convening at a 
round-table of their own in Brussels in preparation for the “Inter-Congolese Dialogue” 
scheduled for the following month, had declared their desire to see a future Congo 
“decentralized, but one and unitary.”
15   
  These aspirations for national unity are not only a feature of the political class.  
Asked about their expectations for 2002, respondents to a December 2001 opinion 
poll in Kinshasa most commonly cited peace and the reunification of the country 
(42%), well ahead of democratic elections (2%).  An average of about 70% of them 
also declared fearing the country’s partition in the course of four surveys in 2001.
16  A 
few years earlier, in November 1998, 89% had declared being against the partition of 
the country.
 17  These statements from politicians and evidence from opinion polls fall 
well short, however, of conveying the puzzling intensity with which the Congolese 
affirm their national pride.  In numerous interviews with Congolese in the state 
apparatus, academia, civil society, rebel groups or traditional institutions, one 
encounters a remarkable uniformity of views on this question.  In Kisangani, 
delegates of women’s organizations did not identify their number one priority as 
feeding their children or living in peace.  On the contrary, they stated:  “The first thing 
is unity of the country.  That is the first thing we want.  We used to be one.” 
18  In the 
same town, a human rights activist declared “the Congolese do not want to see their 
country balkanized.  Balkanization is a diabolic plan because the desire of the 
Congolese people to stay together is unquestionable.  It would not serve the interests 
of the population; just the interests of foreign powers.”
19  In notoriously secessionist 
Katanga, André Tshombé, the son of the late president of Katanga, Moïse Tshombé, 
who deems to be his father’s political heir, stated “there is diversity here but [….] we 
are also Congolese.”
20  And a popular shirt in Kinshasa in 2001 read “the territorial 
                                                 
13 Bureau d’Etudes et de Recherches Consulting International.  L’an I de Joseph Kabila au pouvoir:  
l’Etat de gouvernance sous Kabila II.  Kinshasa:  BERCI, 14 January 2002. 
14 Colette Braekman interview with Joseph Kabila, Le Soir, 2 May 2002.  
15 “Procès Verbal….”   Mi meo document. 
16 Bureau d’Etudes et de Recherches Consulting International.  L’An I …, p. 60. 
17  November 1998 opinion poll, cited in Bureau d’Etudes et de Recherches Consulting International.  
Les leçons à tirer de la conférence nationale souveraine et ses implications pour le dialogue 
intercongolais  Kinshasa: BERCI, June 2001, p.61.   
18  Personal interview with women members of civil society organizations, Kisangani, November 2001.  
19  Personal anonymous interview with members of civic-oriented NGOs, Kisangani, November 2001. 
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integrity of the DRC is not up for negotiation.”
21  The Congolese never talk of 
territorial adjustments, partition or reconfigurations, but always use words such as 
balkanization or dismemberment (“dépeçage”) and almost universally see any idea of 
territorial change as evil, conspiratorial, and the result of foreign—and often US—
based machinations to prevent Congo from rising to its natural grandeur.  
  This paper offers a theory of the reproduction of the weak Congolese state in 
the era of globalization.  It argues that, far from abating with the end of the cold war 
and the weakening of Congo’s empirical statehood, Congo’s international sovereignty 
has been preserved if not reinforced by the Congolese and foreign actors alike.  For 
the Congolese elites, state sovereignty is a paramount force, which allows for the 
transformation of the weak state into an economic resource and dwarfs the potential 
returns of alternative agendas of self-determination.  Because of several benefits 
associated with the international recognition of Congo’s sovereignty, political elites 
choose to pursue their profiteering strategies in the context of Congo itself.  As a 
result, violent rebellions revolve around the terms of the rebels’ integration in the state 
rather than over the nature of the state itself.   Populations at large, on the other hand, 
value the continued existence of the state despite its abuses, because it offers a 
structure of predictability that is not associated with guerillas, warlords or secessionist 
movements.  Grass-root Congolese prefer therefore to voice their local cultural 
identities in competition with each other for access to local resources, rather than in 
defiance of the state itself.  Far from favoring the dilution of the state in their eyes, 
globalization offers them uncertain and dangerous alternatives, the risks of which they 
remain adverse to.  Foreign companies also find benefits in continuing to deal with the 
weak state.  While its very weaknesses offer numerous opportunities for rents, its 
continued sovereignty offers them relative guarantees, such as insurance 
opportunities, not available in deals with non-sovereign entities.  Finally, Western 
powers and international organizations also prefer to replicate the structure of 
Congolese statehood rather than to facilitate alternative scenarios.  All of them fear 
the unknown and the setting of a precedent in revising colonial boundaries.  
Maintaining Congo also guarantees the continuation of its international obligations to 
the West, such as debt servicing. 
  As a result, the incentives of the Congolese and of foreign states and 
companies collude to keep Congo as Congo.  Forces of globalization that are expected 
to dilute the state and promote the politicization of alternative identities, such as the 
cultural influences of diasporas or the informalization and occasional criminalization 
of networks of resource exploitation do not, in the end, measure up to the incentives 
of sovereign reproduction in the Congolese context. The paper ends with a discussion 
of why Congo may differ from other countries in this respect. 
 
 
2.  The Weak Sovereign State as a Resource 
In order to understand the ways in which the Congolese state has adjusted to the 
global economic, political and cultural influences of the last decade, one must first 
apprehend its very nature and the manner in which it functions.  Two elements stand 
out.  First, the very weakness of the state is a resource to many Congolese, which 
paradoxically contributes to its resilience.  Second, the international recognition of 
Congo’s sovereignty as a state is a crucial mechanism which guarantees its 
reproduction and is also a resource in itself.   
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2.1. The Benefits of the Weak State 
Although it may appear at first as merely dysfunctional, the weak Congolese state 
actually benefits numerous segments of its population.  Ministries, state agencies, 
provincial administrations and other bureaucratic appendages of the state are 
maintained by state elites, their employees and citizens in general because they derive 
private benefits from them irrespective of these institutions’ capacity to perform their 
initial public functions.  At the most direct level, people continue to report to work in 
the hope of receiving their wages or in order to preserve their claim to hypothetical 
future payments of their wages.  Thus, whether in government-controlled or in rebel 
territory, unpaid civil servants start their day by going to work “pour rester 
matriculés,” before heading off to their field or to other survival economic activity.  
This follows the logic of “salarization” of society by the state which lies at the core of 
the African post-colonial social contract.
22  But there is more to the persistence of the 
state than the expectation of direct payments.  The capacity to use the weak state as an 
instrument of predation is the most crucial element of the logic of its survival and 
reproduction.  At many levels of society, people with parcels of state authority, 
however limited, can market them and extract resources from their fellow citizens, 
while others, not directly associated with the state, can also benefit from these 
practices.
23   
  This is particularly true at the apex of the state.  Laurent-Désiré Kabila, for 
example, was a prototypical case of translation of economic interests into a strategy of 
conquest and reproduction of the state under the veil of a discourse of national 
liberation.  Kabila used such a discourse, together with the image of the nationalist 
hero and the Lumumbist mystique, as part of his strategy to take over the Mobutuist 
state and profit from it.  Kabila was an entrepreneur, a businessman for whom taking 
over the state was the most remarkable economic opportunity of his lifetime.  He 
treated Congo as one giant resource available for plunder to those in positions of state 
power.  His COMIEX company entered several commercial deals under the umbrella 
of the state after his takeover in 1997.
24  At the time of his death, in January 2001, 
diamonds were found in his office, supporting rumors that he participated in diamond 
trafficking.  The killing by security forces of 11 Lebanese diamond traders in the 
wake of the president’s assassination also militate for the thesis that Kabila’s physical 
elimination had more to do with a business vendetta than a political coup.
25  Rebel 
leaders too find an interest in keeping the state machinery alive in the regions under 
their control.  They do so because they wish to preserve the state as an instrument of 
patronage, a crucial resource to build support for their quest for power.
26 
                                                 
22 Achille Mbembe.  On the Postcolony.  Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 2001. 
23 This argument parallels Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz’s idea of “instrumentalization” of 
dysfunctionality in Africa.  See their Africa Works:  The Instrumentalization of Disorder. Bloomington:  
Indiana University Press, 1998. 
 
 
24 See, for example, Africa Research Bulletin:  Economic, Financial and Technical Series, September-
October 2001, 14928. 
25 See Observatoire de l’Afrique Centrale, Volume 5, No 42, 14-20 October 2002 
[www.obsac.com/OBSV5N43-ProcessMzee1021.html].   
26 Denis Tull.  2002.  “A Reconfiguration of Political Order?  The State of the State in North Kivu (DR 
Congo).”  Paper presented at the XVIII. International Biennial Conference of the African Studies 
Association in Germany (VAD), Hamburg, May 23-26:5-6.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS95   Page 8 
  Yet, Kabila’s corporate presidency was not the strategy of one man or an 
isolated state elite against a dispossessed population or a voiceless civil society, and 
the patrimonial uses of state institutions by the rebel leaders are not either specific to 
them.  Many people, starting with Kabila’s fellow Balubakat in Katanga, benefited 
from the late president’s “policies” and provided his system with sufficient 
foundations to function relatively unchallenged from within, and for the state to 
remain unaffected by its de facto privatization in the hands of political elites.  Rebel 
leaders do not operate in a vacuum either.  Irrespective of their popularity, their desire 
to maintain the state is widely supported.  This is because, at many levels of society, 
people can derive private benefits from the continuation of Congo’s weak state 
institutions.  Judges, for example, charge parties for favorable judgments, and clerks 
sell on-demand modified versions of judgments and official acts.  These “corrupt” 
judges and clerks depend on the continuation of state weakness for their income, as do 
the lawyers who probably collect additional fees for their out-of-court settlements and 
private arbitrations.  Although the parties to a case may prima facie be perceived as 
victims of the system’s corruption, their need for official documents as evidence of 
judgments preserves the demand for these state-sanctioned official legal services.  In 
the state’s ghostly universities, professors privately charge fees, which the students 
willingly pay in exchange for a state-sanctioned degree, irrespective of its current lack 
of substance.  Professors also benefit from the absence of new appointments and 
promotions due to the university’s fiscal crisis, which shields them from academic 
competition.  The moribund state-owned copper and cobalt-mining company, 
Gécamines, also represents a substantial resource to state agents and its 24,000 
employees, even though its actual production has collapsed from some 500,000 tons 
in the late 1980s to about 20,000 tons now.  Yet, it remains the owner of Katanga’s 
considerable mineral deposits and can translate its own legal existence into joint-
venture contracts with foreign companies, from which its management and local elites 
accrue substantial income.  There are currently about 23 such joint ventures.
27  The 
government receives revenue from its participation in them, taxes them and imposes 
miscellaneous additional fees, although Gécamines itself has not paid dividends since 
1996.
28  If it were to be privatized, its production may well resume more substantially, 
but its managers, employees and the state itself would lose control of such deals.  As 
long as Gécamines remains a parastatal company, however, the Congolese can legally 
market its assets.  The current position of its administrators with respect to 
privatization---that management be privatized but that assets remain under its 
ownership---reflects this desire to use Gécamines as an instrument for business 
deals.
29   
The logic of this system penetrates even further down the social hierarchy.  
When driving between Congolese cities, one encounters numerous stretches of deeply 
deteriorated roads, physical expressions of state decay.  At the location of significant 
potholes or some other major obstacle, it is not uncommon to come across virtual 
roadblocks of local youth, armed with shovels, and demanding payment for their 
“maintenance” of the road.  In fact, far from repairing or providing maintenance work 
on the road, they symbolically throw a shovel of dirt into the hole as the car 
approaches, guaranteeing over the long run that the road remains in bad repair, as 
happens with other dimensions of Congo’s decayed but enduring statehood.  Durably 
fixing the road would deprive these local youth of the immediate source of revenue 
                                                 
27 Digitalcongo.net [accessed 3 May 2002] 
28 Anonymous interview with Gécamines executive manager, Lubumbashi, April 2002. 
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which they derive from this quasi-taxation of travelers.  Hence, the road with its 
potholes is a resource to them.  It is the road’s very weakness that allows them to turn 
it into a resource.  As a group and from a longer-term perspective, they would 
probably benefit from fixing it and encouraging traffic, facilitating thereby their 
village’s insertion in local trade networks.  But from a short-term individual 
perspective, they find greater benefit in turning the decayed public road into a private 
resource.  Note, however, that these young men are by no means part of Congo’s elite.  
They are what Bayart calls “cadets sociaux,” people at the bottom of the social 
scale.
30  Yet, whereas one would be tempted to see them as victims of Congo’s failed 
development, their actions show them to be also predators who use one effect of state 
incapacity---bad roads---as the instrument of their predation.
31  In all the above-
mentioned cases, it is the very dysfunctionality and weakness of state or state-
controlled institutions which allows the latter to be transformed into private resources.  
There is thus little incentive among the Congolese to boost state capacity or improve 
the quality of governance, as this would reduce opportunities for income while 
promoting at best only distant improvements in the quality of life.   
Finally, the weak state is not only an instrumental resource for predatory 
human relations; it also represents an intrinsic resource to individuals at the bottom of 
the social hierarchy.  For grass-root Congolese, who find themselves systematically 
on the predated side of Congolese history, the state remains a crucial resource to the 
extent that it offers a minimum level of certainty about public life, the opportunity to 
form relatively stable expectations about where power and resources lie, and a 
modicum of reduction of transaction costs as they go about their lives.  Political 
uncertainty, warlords, insurgencies and the like, on the other hand, blur the cards of 
politics for common people, and complicate, if not endanger, their daily lives.  State 
stability is therefore an intrinsic resource in the lives of people who have to struggle 
for survival as it represents an anchor in their volatile and vulnerable life.
32  
Combined with the fact that oppressed people who are preoccupied with survival on a 
daily basis cannot be assumed to undertake revolutions, this helps account for the 
widespread distribution of nationalist sentiments among the population and for their 
reproduction at a time of failing statehood.  To some extent, the idea of Congo’s 
grandeur is all that remains to a people that has been dispossessed of its wealth, its 
peace and much of its human dignity.  Far from contradicting their misery, nationalist 
fervor further helps concede from the Congolese that their own state may lie at the 
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2.2. The Benefits of Sovereignty 
There is more than the mere weakness of the state to transform it into a private 
resource, however.  The international recognition of the sovereignty of Congo’s state 
institutions is a paramount mechanism by which, first, the weak state can be 
reproduced and its predatory nature maintained and, second, additional resources can 
accrue to the holders of state power.  The impact of international sovereignty on the 
reproduction of the predatory state is thus twofold:  it supports predatory activities; 
and it is a resource to be exploited per se.   
  From the perspective of its supportive role, the first effect of international 
sovereignty on state predation is its capacity to free up state elites from the constraints 
of state building, of constructing and maintaining institutional capacity, and of 
asserting territorial control.  The juridical guarantee of the state’s existence that is the 
by-product of international sovereignty reduces pressures for capacity building.
33  
Starting with Laurent-Désiré Kabila, Congolese political elites have pushed this logic 
to its limit by surrendering control of large chunks of their territory.  In effect, when 
he invited Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean military interventions in 1998, Kabila 
traded control over territory and physical resources for the preservation of formal state 
control and, hence, sovereign status.  By guaranteeing its existence under virtually any 
set of circumstances, international sovereignty allows the state to enforce itself upon 
its citizens without having to resort to continuous violence, and without the capacity 
to truly penetrate society.   To refer to Migdal’s classic terminology, sovereignty 
shields political elites from the penalties associated with the “weak state-strong 
society” dichotomy.
34  It prevents failed institutions from disappearing and allows 
them to outlive their functional existence.   
  The second supportive role of sovereignty is further reaching.  In their 
predatory activities, state agents derive domestic power from the evidence of their 
international legitimacy.  Sovereignty, with its international sanction, gives state 
institutions and personnel, substance, structure and power, and makes them hard to 
escape for the Congolese.
35  For sure, external recognition is not the only source of 
control over local populations, in Congo as elsewhere.  In the absence of such 
recognition, rebel groups are occasionally able to develop strong local control based 
on local legitimacy or social structure.  The cases of Yoweri Museveni’s National 
Resistance Army in Uganda in the 1980s, or of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
in Ethiopia until the early 1990s are cases in point.  Yet, in the absence of such strong 
domestic legitimacy, the evidence of international legitimacy provided by the 
recognition of the sovereign status of a government can be used as an instrument of 
political control.  One of its main benefits is to allow governments to present 
predation as policy, which somewhat shields it from challenges.  This was the case, 
for example, with Mobutu’s policy of “Zaireanization” of foreign-owned assets in 
1974, which privately transferred the assets of foreigners to government cronies and 
their allies, a case of theft masqueraded as policy.  It was also the case of the 1981 law 
that stripped all Congolese of Rwandan origins (the so-called Banyarwanda) of their 
citizenship, a case of governmental repression of a minority.  This law was confirmed 
in the early 1990s by the transition parliament appointed by the National Sovereign 
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Conference.  (Note, additionally, how the National Conference felt it necessary to 
label itself Sovereign as part of its attempt to wrestle political control away from the 
state.)  The capacity to act as sovereign ruler is also what has allowed individuals in 
the current Kinshasa government to engage in what the United Nations has called 
“asset stripping.”  According to the final report of the UN Panel of Experts on the 
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, an “elite network” of Congolese and Zimbabwean 
state and military interests “transferred ownership of at least US$5billion of assets 
from the State mining sector to private companies under its control in the past three 
years with no compensation or benefit for the State treasury of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.”
36  In this case, sovereignty is a legal artifice which protects the 
exploitation of Congo’s resources by state elites and their allies.  Rebel leaders, 
deprived of international sovereignty, do not have the same options.  In the east of the 
country, Rwanda and Uganda by and large directly exploit natural resources under 
their military control, bypassing local rebel organizations and juridical pretenses.  
Local rebels then try to control and tax the residual production, but are incapable of 
entering into contractual relations of exploitation and to transfer ownership of local 
assets to themselves, as they lack the juridical personality to do so.   
  In all these cases, therefore, the government’s capacity to act as sovereign 
ruler confers the seal of legality to robbery and persecution, and contributes thereby to 
the elites’ strategies of accumulation.  Whether in the case of Zaireanization, of the 
Banyaranda or of the exploitation of Congo’s natural resources, the instruments of 
predation are policy instruments which are reserved to states.  Rebels may want to 
pass decrees expropriating assets but the legality of these will be challenged as soon 
as possible and their enforcement will depend on the rebels’ monopoly of physical 
force.
37  Passing a law to penalize a specific group in society, on the other hand, is an 
instrument of domination reserved to the sovereign, irrespective of its own empirical 
weakness.   
  International sovereignty is not only a domestic currency.  It also shields weak 
governments from outside interference, as they can raise the principle of non-
intervention in their domestic affairs against outside attempts to check their excesses.  
Only in the most outrageous cases of genocide and crimes against humanity is this 
principle bent in international law, and even then hardly so (as witnessed by the lack 
of serious intervention on behalf of Rwanda’s Tutsis in 1994).  For daily economic 
exploitation at the hands of a sovereign state, however, there is no international legal 
recourse for domestic populations.  The three successive reports of the UN Panel of 
Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, take a relatively harder stance 
towards Rwandan and Ugandan exactions than those of Angola, Zimbabwe and the 
Congolese government itself.  The first of its report in fact only covered the activities 
of Rwanda and Uganda.  It is only after these two countries complained of this 
unequal treatement that its investigations were extended to the government side, 
which was finally called to account in the latest report in October 2002.  Yet, when 
they do in fact end up accused of abuses, governments can still hide behind their 
sovereignty to dodge the bullet, with the likely sympathy of many other governments 
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(as attested by most of Africa’s failure to condem Zimbabwe’s recent predatory 
policies and electoral frauds).  As the Congolese government spokesman, Kikaya Bin 
Karubi, told the BBC in reference to accusations against members of the government 
in the report of the UN Panel of Experts, “The Congolese government is the legitimate 
government of this country … Whatever we do is legitimate.”
38  Of course, this does 
not imply that this line of reasoning is always successful.  As the UN report 
demonstrates, the Congolese government---or members thereof---did in fact come 
under accusatory scrutiny for exploiting the resources of the country.  Yet, it is a line 
of defense that other actors do not have. Although it can be overturned, there is 
therefore a favorable presumption towards sovereign governments.  There are also 
few recourse in international law against the validity of the contracts passed by the 
government with foreign companies for the exploitation of the country’s natural 
resources.   
Beyond these adjuvant roles to state predation, sovereignty also represents 
intrinsic value to holders of state power.  First and foremost, international sovereignty 
entitles regimes to official development assistance, which fuels their networks of 
patronage and funds the transformation of the state into a resource.
39  While they may 
appear restricted to political elites, aid flows benefit a cross-section of Congolese 
society, which appropriates them through the government’s budget and the 
clientelistic networks of political elites.  Whether aid flows accrue to the state budget 
or to the private accounts of holders of state authority is a more or less moot 
disctinction in Congo, since most of the budget itself is privatized.  Many civil 
servants on payrolls are fictitious.  Salaries given to these people actually represent 
the private conversion of institutional public resources.  In addition, the budget (when 
there is one—there weren’t any for the first few years of L.-D. Kabila’s rule) is by and 
large allocated to discretionary funds.  In 1992, the Bank of Zaire reported that 95% 
of the national budget was earmarked for the services of the presidency (65% 
according to the World Bank), as opposed to 4% for agriculture and 0% for social 
services.
40  Foreign aid is thus a highly valuable resource for power holders.  And it is 
conditioned by norms of sovereign statehood and territorial integrity, as only 
recognized countries receive development aid.
41  
International sovereignty also facilitates foreign direct investments, from 
which local elites benefit.  These are often conditional upon guarantees of insurance 
and arbitration, access to which depends on the sovereign status of the recipient 
country.  The World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) only 
works with sovereign entities.  The United States’ Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) only offers insurance to investors operating in entities recognized 
by the United States government.  As a result, the Kinshasa government is much more 
likely to attract foreign operators in the regions under its control---and extract 
resources from them and in conjunction with them---than are rebel authorities in their 
regions.  In fact, there have only been two documented instances of contractual 
investments between foreign companies and non-state authorities in Congo.  In the 
first case, Anglo-American, a South African mining company, concluded an 
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investment contract worth almost $1bn with Laurent-Désiré Kabila a few months 
before the latter took over power in Kinshasa.  It was, however, only after both Mbuji-
Mayi and Lubumbashi had fallen to Kabila’s troops in April 1997, and barely a month 
before the fall of Kinshasa, that Anglo-American embarked on this deal.  As Michael 
Ross notes, therefore, this was an instance of “future booty” based on the anticipation 
of Kabila’s approaching sovereignty, rather than of pure contracting between rebels 
and foreign firms.
42  The fact that Anglo-American’s CEO, Jean-Raymond Boulle, 
lent his private airplane to Kabila’s troops further suggests his hope and anticipation 
of their victory.  The second instance occurred in the east of the country, in November 
1999, under control of the spin-off rebel group Rassemblement Congolais pour la 
Démocratie-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML), and involved a less-than-reputable 
firm, the First International Bank of Grenada (FIBG), which agreed to spend $16m for 
the renovation of 15 hospitals and some roads in the Orientale province, apparently in 
exchange for becoming the equivalent of the RCD’s central bank and issuing “a 
mining-assets backed new currency in the rebel territories.”  Had this deal actually 
gone through, it would have constituted a remarkable case of institutional innovation 
and an attempt by a rebel organization to take over some of the trappings of 
sovereignty.  The RCD-ML soon fizzled away as a credible organization, however, 
and seemed to sink the deal with it, though it is unclear whether this arrangement 
could have become operational even if RCD-ML had survived.  FIBG had indeed 
been previously banned from activities in Canada because of investment frauds, and 
the US Customs service was investigating it for money laundering allegations.
43  
These two exceptions notwithstanding, foreign investments are overwhelmingly 
limited to zones of international sovereignty.   
 
3.  The Preference for Nationalism 
3.1. Functions of the Nationalist Discourse   
The benefits of weak statehood and sovereignty promote the adoption of a nationalist, 
rather than secessionist or revolutionary, outlook by most Congolese, despite the 
failures of the state and the multiple polarizations of society.  Political elites wish to 
maintain the failed sovereign state because it represents a resource---both instrumental 
and intrinsic---, the private benefits of which they can reap.  The neopatrimonial logic 
of rule in Congo implies that a large number of non-elites also benefit from the 
transformation of the nation-state into a private resource because of their participation 
in the elite’s clientelistc networks, and fail to challenge its existence and its 
domination.  In addition, the state’s intrinsic value as a relatively predictable structure 
of power makes it appealing to individuals despite, and even because, the ongoing 
simultaneity of centrifugal experiments in peripheral provinces and rebel-controlled 
territories.   
  For elites, the nationalist discourse provides the ideological legitimation of 
their strategy of institutions-as-resources, a tool for reinforcing and reproducing the 
state, and a means to counteract and disenfranchise the political expression of 
                                                 
42 Michael L. Ross.  “Booty Futures:  Africa’s Civil Wars and the Futures Market for Natural 
Resources.”  Unpublished manuscript.  UCLA Department of Political Science, July 2002. 
43  Africa Research Bulletin, December 1999-January 2000, 14162-14163.  It is of some interest that the 
only rebel organization to have attempted to embark on such a deal was under the control of Ernest 
Wamba-Dia-Wamba, one of the few Congolese intellectuals to ever have challenged the Congolese 
“nation-state project.”  See Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba.  1996.  “The National Question in Zaire:  
Challenges to the Nation-State Project.”  In Adebayo O. Olukoshi and Liisa Laakso (eds.).  Op. Cit., 
136-153.   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS95   Page 14 
alternative public identities.  For citizens in general, nationalism is the political 
expression of a preference for established, if dysfunctional, state institutions over 
unpredictable reconfigurations of power and economic life.  Whereas the preference 
for stable, if negative, expectations by private citizens largely accounts for the spread 
of the nationalist discourse throughout the lower reaches of society, the following 
pages focus mostly on the behavior and rationales of political elites to the extent that 
the latter, operating in an environment free of democratic pressures, are almost 
exclusively responsible for actual political outcomes. 
The rapidity with which most pre-independence Congolese political elites 
switched from defending their regional interests to pursuing nationalist agendas 
illustrates the benefits they found in this ideology for their pursuit of power.  At the 
constitution-making Round-Table of 1960, the idea of a unified Congo was already 
removed from the realm of the negotiable.  Rejecting a system that would have given 
more power to the provinces, independence politician Joseph Iléo declared "The 
conference certainly does not have the objective to prepare the explosion [éclatement] 
of Congo."
44 Most regional leaders then traded off their original separatist or 
federalist demands for positions in the national state.  Joseph Kasavubu, whose 
Association des BaKongo (ABAKO) party had earlier announced the creation of a 
Bakongo-based “Republic of Central Kongo,” was offered the presidency by the 
Belgians partly out of fear of Bakongo separatism.
45  In exchange for such access to 
the state, he buried once and for all any element of Bakongo autonomy or irredentism 
in his discourse.  Moïse Tshombé followed the same logic, although a few years later.  
After having rejected the national idea and launched the secession of Katanga from 
1960 to 1963, he accepted the position of prime minister of all of Congo in 1964, 
trading off regional autonomous aspirations for a central position in state power.   
The same holds true of contemporary rebel groups.  The MLC’s 
overwhelming interest in regaining access to state power was illustrated by the 
agreement between its leader, Jean-Pierre Bemba, and Joseph Kabila in the margins of 
the Sun City Inter-Congolese Dialogue in April 2002.  The same is true of the RCD, 
however, despite persistent rumors of its separatist intentions.  The RCD rebellion 
does not have independence or secession as an objective.  Rather than self-
determination, the current rebellion is a repositionning exercise.  Hence, the use of the 
nationalistic discourse as an ideological justification for such objectives.  In the words 
of RCD-Goma Secretry-General Azaryas Ruberwa:   
We want a united Congo.  There are more advantages to a united Congo than 
a partitioned Congo.  We have never thought of secession.  It is impossible to 
conceive of it.  Our leaders are from all provinces.  What we do want is to 
change the mode of management in Congo and to have more autonomy for the 
provinces.  We want federalism.  We say yes to the unity of Congo but never 
to unitarism.  [….] Territorial integrity allows us to remain une puissance en 
Afrique [sic]  [….] Let's create a Congolese nation because it does not exist 
yet.
46   
 
The RCD governor of the Oriental Province, Jean-Pierre Biloussa, echoes similar 
sentiments:  "This is a movement for power in Kinshasa.”
47  
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The many factional splits which the RCD has encountered since its creation in 
1998 are consequences of this logic, as they usually derive from the unwillingness of 
leadership elements to wait any longer for better forms of reinsertion with Kinshasa.  
In May 1999, realizing that Rwanda was no longer interested in a military takeover of 
Kinshasa, RCD leader Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba set up his own faction, the RCD-
Kisangani, and sought Ugandan protection.  In February 2001, another split led to the 
creation of the RCD-National (emphasis mine), also based on a rejection of Rwanda’s 
limited objectives of controlling Hutu rebels in the Kivu and Orientale provinces.  
Finally, more leaders escaped in May 2002 to set up the RCD-Authentique.  These 
three groups (RCD-Kisangani, RCD-National and RCD-Authentique) all declared 
their willingness to collaborate with Kinshasa and the first two were actually 
signatories to the Sun City power-sharing agreement.  
In Congo, political violence provides the means to fight for (re)insertion into 
the system by marginalized and excluded groups.  It does not represent attempts to 
challenge, reform, revolutionize, or break away from the state.  The association of 
political violence with a universal nationalist discourse is thus only superficially 
paradoxical.  While competing for state access for the benefit of the particularistic 
interests of their own group, political elites use a nationalist discourse as platform to 
build a minimum winning coalition, and to define others as non-patriotic and keep 
them on the outside.  Hence, Joseph Kabila’s earlier-mentioned labeling of the Sun 
City agreement as “patriotic,” which implied that the RCD-Goma, excluded from the 
accord, was an enemy of Congo.  Competition in the display of nationalism can thus 
be perceived as competition for power.  The nationalist discourse becomes then the 
foundation for the reproduction of the state’s otherwise failed and predatory 
institutions, denying legitimacy to alternative scenarios and confining all other such 
actions to military factionalism for control of the state itself, or to the non-threatening 
realm of “civil society.”  By reinforcing the reproduction of the state, it guarantees the 
predatory potential of its institutions.   
Although the country’s natural wealth may be concentrated in regions far 
away from the capital, the limited likelihood that any secessionist movement would be 
internationally recognized considerably reduces the appeal of local separatist 
strategies of power in normal times.  Secessionist moments in Congo’s history have 
occurred when the sovereignty of the central state was challenged from outside, or 
when the economic returns to sovereignty depreciated.  This happened in the very 
early years of independence when it was not yet clear how livable postcolonies would 
be, and when political chaos in the capital led foreign powers to consider other 
options than backing the state as a whole.  It also happened in the 1990s when 
Mobutu’s failure to convincingly democratize and his alleged recourse to violence 
against students at the University of Lubumbashi led the West to marginalize him and 
cut off virtually all aid flows to his regime.  In times like these, it makes sense for 
local elites to capitalize on the weakening international status of the state and 
experiment with local strategies of power and access to resources.  This is what 
explains the secessions of the 1960s and the drives for autonomy of Kasai and 
Katanga in the 1990s.  But the embrace by the West of Kabila’s takeover in 1997 
(embalmed in nationalist discourse) again put an end to opportunities for local 
strategies of self-determination and brought the Congolese back around their state.  
When nationalism prevails, however, local identities fail to find outlets to their 
cultural specificities.  As a result, ethnic clientelism and polarization rise and coexist 
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Secessions can thus be expected if the potential return of local resources, in 
the absence of international recognition, outweighs the potential return of resources 
associated with control or partial control of the sovereign national state.  To the extent 
that they represent the actions of political elites choosing to capitalize upon local 
cultural or economic grievances, separatist decisions must therefore be understood as 
rational calculus of potential costs and benefits.  In the case of the former Soviet 
Union, Daniel Treisman found that there is  
a strong relationship between the economic prospects and bargaining power of 
an ethnic region and its degree of separatist activism.  Those ethnic regions 
that had large populations and high industrial output, were major raw material 
producers, or had high industrial exports were much more separatist.  Those 
that relied heavily on central subventions to fund regional government 
spending tended to be more cautious.  This suggests a strong element of 
rational calculation in the incidence of separatist action.
48 
 
In Congo, the dependence on the state is more than a matter of subsidies, it is a 
question of being able to use public institutions as private resources.  This appeal of 
the state competes with the appeal of local raw materials in the decisions of regional 
leaders to secede or not. But, without international recognition of the sovereignty of 
public authorities making a claim to these raw materials, their physical control is 
usually not sufficient for their translation into resources. 
 
3.2. Self-Determination in Congolese History 
A review of Congo’s episodes of rebellion or alleged secession attempts illustrates the 
see-saw between nationalism and separatism as a function of the strength and 
perceived benefits of sovereignty.  The pattern that emerges is one in which 
movements and drives towards autonomy and secession are attempted either when the 
sovereignty of the central state is contested from abroad, or when the benefits of 
institutional enforcement and resource distribution associated with sovereignty are 
threatened. 
Although it is often referred to as a Belgian plot to retain control over the 
mineral resources of Congo, the Katanga secession of 1960-1963 also broadly derived 
from Congolese dynamics of power, identity differentiation, and resource grievances.  
From a local perspective, it was predicated upon the desire of “indigenous” Katangan 
populations, represented by traditional chiefly associations and ethnic mutual welfare 
societies, to take control of their political and economic destiny away from other 
Congolese living in their province, and especially from the Kasaian migrants who 
represented the local Congolese administrative and business elite.  Moïse Tshombé’s 
Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT) was indeed 
mostly composed of Lunda and Yeke people who considered themselves “authentic 
Katangans” as opposed to the “strangers” from Kasai (mostly Luba) who had 
immigrated to work in Katangan mines.  The secession was also based on a sense of 
economic grievance vis-à-vis the central state, as Katanga’s contribution to Congo’s 
revenues approached 50% while its receipts from the national budget only reached 
20% in 1957.
49  
But, above all, the Katanga secession was an opportunistic decision by 
Tshombé who bet on the possibility that the Congolese state would not survive the 
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upheavals and mutinies that immediately followed the proclamation of its 
independence on June 30, 1960, and decided there was more potential for a future in 
regional rather than in national politics.  The Katanga declaration of independence 
occurred on July 12, eight days after the beginning of the Force Publique mutiny.  On 
July 13, Prime Minister Lumumba broke diplomatic relations with Belgium because 
of its sympathies with Katanga, inadvertently reducing Congo’s international 
sovereignty in the process.  The next day Kasavubu and Lumumba approached the 
Soviet Union about the possibility of military assistance.
 50  Compounded with the two 
men’s incapacity to restore order in their country, this request further weakened the 
legitimacy of the central state in the eyes of the West in the Cold War context.  The 
Cold War was indeed an important parameter in the Katanga secession as it pitted 
“leftist” Lumumba with “anti-communist” Tshombé, and affected perceptions of 
Congo’s sovereignty as the West weighed the benefits of protecting a fractured newly 
independent Congo with potentially communist tendencies, against a relatively more 
peaceful and pro-capitalist Katanga.  Tensions then mounted between Kasavubu and 
Lumumba, who dismissed each other from office and further projected abroad the 
image of a stillborn state, which in turn gave additional momentum to the secession, 
predicated as it was upon the uncertainties of state recognition.  Joining the secession 
was also a decision based on access to the state for other Katangan elites.  Provincial 
opposition parties, foremost among whom the Balubakat, were apparently on the 
verge of supporting Tshombé in voting for secession, but relented when he did not 
fulfill his promise to enlarge his cabinet with ministers from the Baluba region.
51   
The Katanga secession was never successful, however.  Tshombé requested 
recognition and admittance to the United Nations but was ignored, and it bears 
insisting that no country, not even Belgium, ever recognized Katanga as an 
independent state.  “No matter that the rest of the Congo was degenerating into 
nightmarish chaos,” writes a sympathetic author, “Katanga was the offender who had 
to be called to order.” 
52  After Lumumba’s assassination in Katanga on January 17, 
1961, the legitimacy of the secession vis-à-vis the state was hurt.  On February 21, the 
UN Security Council passed a resolution to prevent civil war in the Congo, largely in 
response to the murder of Lumumba and the increasing anarchy, and authorized the 
use of force against Katanga.  On August 2, 1961, a national executive that struggled 
with legitimacy gave way to a government of national unity (except for Katanga) 
under Cyrille Adoula, set up under UN auspices.  Finally, with US backing, the UN 
forces defeated the Katanga secession in 1963 and Tshombé was sent into exile, while 
his region rejoined the fold of the state, albeit split in three provinces.   
After initial hesitations in 1960, during which Tshombé seized his opportunity, 
the international community rallied behind the sovereignty of Congo and doomed 
Katanga’s chances for successful secession.  During the whole period from 1960 to 
1963, however, Tshombé continued to negotiate with the Congolese government on 
the terms of a possible reunification, which is further evidence that Congolese 
secessions are not so much instances of cultural self-determination as tactical moves 
for state power.  Tellingly, after the defeat of his secession, Tshombé became prime 
minister of Congo in 1964.  Foreign powers by and large guaranteed the reproduction 
of the Congolese state at this very early stage and provided it with life support, 
crucially altering the expected payoffs of Tshombé’s action and turning Congo from a 
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moribund shell into a worthwhile resource.  Certainly, Belgium provided Katanga 
with military, economic and technical assistance, including advisors, mercenaries and 
a writer for its constitution.
53  As a result, it was accused of instigating and supporting 
the secession in order to maintain control of its former colony.  But, after Lumumba’s 
death, it increasingly sided with the central government, thus contributing to the 
failure of the secession.   
The “Great Mining State of South Kasai” was the other main secessionist 
movement of that period.  In August 1960, after Lumumba had managed to hand over 
the province’s leadership to a Lulua, although the Baluba had won the most seats in 
the May 1960 elections, Lumumba's troops attacked Mbuji-Mayi in South Kasai and 
massacred Baluba civilian populations.  In response, Albert Kalonji, a Luba from 
Kasai who was one of Lumumba’s main rivals in the Mouvement National Congolais 
(MNC), and was embittered by his failure to secure an influential position in the 
national government, proclaimed the Mining State, and organized for autonomous 
rule.  The army of South Kasai included 3,000 men and nine European officers in 
1961.
54  Kalonji had the support of the Luba, who feared that the central government 
would gain control of Kasai’s diamond mines.  More than Tshombé, Kalonji was a 
political opportunist who seized the occasion of a chaotic central state in Kinshasa to 
reorient his quest for power on the local stage.  As Nzongola-Ntalaja puts it, Kalonji 
“saw in the chaotic environment of the period the opportunity to realize his dream of 
becoming supreme leader somewhere,” and had himself proclaimed king by local 
traditional rulers.
55  The autonomous state functioned relatively well until September 
1962 when the central government facilitated a local military revolt to regain control 
of the province.  Again, no country recognized the sovereignty of South Kasai and 
Kalonji eventually turned his attentions to the national political stage, becoming 
agriculture minister in the 1964 Tshombé government.   
Both the Katangan and South Kasai examples illustrate the extent to which a 
weakening of the perceived sovereignty of the central state triggered local strategies 
of power by Congolese regional elites, how these were in turn aborted when the 
respective sovereignty statuses of central and provincial authorities were clarified, and 
how the West and the then Western-dominated UN system conditioned these local 
dynamics with their capacity to grant sovereign status to territorial entities. Following 
the stabilization of the sovereign status of Congo after 1963, and the display by the 
international community of its willingness to intervene on behalf of Congo’s 
territorial integrity, challenges to state authority no longer took on separatist 
dimensions but were limited to violent attempts to wrestle control of the state away 
from its perceived “neo-colonialist” regime.  One of these challenges was the Mulelist 
rebellion in Kwilu between 1964 and 1967.  Mulele, a lieutenant of Lumumba who 
had gone into exile after the failure of the first Stanleyville government, returned to 
Congo in 1963 and launched a peasant-based “Maoist” rebellion in the Kwilu 
province in January 1964.  It failed to spread, however, beyond Mulele’s own ethnic 
group. The Simba rebellions in Eastern Congo represented another such case of 
nationalist uprising challenging the state leadership rather than the state itself.  
Laurent-Désiré Kabila and Gaston Soumialot were the main Simba leaders on the 
ground and represented a group of nationalist parties based in Brazzaville.  They 
invaded Congo from Burundi in April 1963 and, by September, controlled half the 
country and seven of the twenty-one provincial capitals.  After setting up their own 
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government in Stanleyville, they promptly lost momentum for failing to develop any 
administration in the regions they controlled militarily.  More importantly, though, the 
Stanleyville government never received any international recognition and could not 
sustain its legitimacy with local populations.  Mercenaries and Belgian paratroopers 
recaptured Stanleyville on November 24, 1964, exemplifying again the importance of 
foreign powers in the maintenance of Zaire’s existence and integrity.  In 1967, the 
Orientale and Maniema provinces were also finally retaken by government troops.  
Only the tiny Fizi-Baraka region in South Kivu remained under control of Kabila for 
many years to come, with apparent complicity from the Zairean army, before 
dissolving in the mid-1980s.
56  
Both the Mulelist insurrection and the Simba rebellion illustrate the changing 
nature of the political game in Congo following the decision by the West to support 
the country’s territorial integrity.  Although the state was still weak and armed 
struggles appeared to be a reasonable means to achieve power, the objective for each 
of these movements was to take over the entire country rather than to break away 
from it.  Secessions, doomed to non-recognition, were no longer perceived as credible 
options.  Nationalist and revolutionary insurrections, on the other hand, could benefit 
from the recognition of non-Western countries and carried therefore a greater promise 
of success.  Indeed, the original Stanleyville government of Antoine Gizenga, set up 
after the dismissal of Lumumba in September 1960, had been recognized by Egypt, 
the USSR, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Guinea, China, Morroco, Ghana, Poland, 
Cuba, and other countries following Lumumba’s assassination in 1961.
57  For Mulele 
and the Simba leadership, therefore, repeating a similar nationalist strategy held the 
promise of recognition and sovereignty. 
But the political conditions after 1964 were no longer in the same state of flux 
as in 1960 and 1961, and Congo had fallen squarely in the Western camp.  No further 
recognition would come for its “second independence” as it failed to conquer the state 
capital and, with it, the claim to state sovereignty.  It was not until 1977 that a new 
self-determination challenge took place.  Once again, with the Mobutuist state having 
reached its apex, this movement did not involve any separatist element, although it 
took place in Katanga, renamed Shaba, and involved the remnants of the secessionist 
Gendarmes who launched an invasion from their Angolan rear-base.  The Shaba 
invasion of 1977, commonly referred to as Shaba I, was led by the Congo National 
Liberation Front (FNLC), established in 1968 by Nathaniel Mbumba and mainly 
composed of Lunda and Chokwe.
 58  On March 8, 1977, some 2,000 FNLC troops 
invaded Shaba and captured three cities as well as several hundred square kilometers 
of western Shaba.  They came close to Kolwezi before Moroccan troops (brought in 
by French aircraft) recaptured lost territory with little engagement.  In April, 
Moroccan forces and the Zairean army re-entered the towns lost in March and the 
FNLC fully retreated by the end of May.  Although its origins derived from the forces 
involved in the Katanga secession of 1960-63 and its ethnic profile was mostly 
Lunda---a population deemed separatist---the FNLC took great pains to differentiate 
itself from the Katanga secessionist movement and stressed the element of national 
liberation of Congo in both its name and its stated goal of taking over the entire 
country.  
The FNLC launched a new invasion in May 1978 (Shaba II), and occupied 
Kolwezi in a surprise move from Zambian territory.  Although its objective this time 
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was to capture Shaba, this was a means to oust Mobutu.  The FNLC seized Kolwezi 
and Mutshatsha, but its undisciplined army began looting, murdering and raping 
Africans and Europeans.  France and Belgium immediately intervened, recaptured the 
town, and the invaders once again returned to Angola.  A permanent contingent of 
1,500 Moroccans was then sent to guard Kolwezi. 
The significance of Shaba I and II is not so much the lack of local support for 
these invasions (which, to some extent, proceeded from well-grounded fears of 
reprisals by the Zairean army), or the fact that they were foreign-driven and did not 
represent local struggles, although these are well-founded observations.  The first 
crucial element of these episodes is that formerly secessionist actors, marginalized 
from the Congolese state, resorted to armed insurrection not so much to carve 
themselves a new political space but to change the regime at the core of Congo and 
force their own reintegration in the post-colonial state.  This strategy is surprising if 
one thinks of the southern Katanga populations as somehow primordially separatist.  
If one considers, however, the political choices of local elites as a function of resource 
maximization, and the latter as a function of their perception of where sovereignty 
lies, the FNLC approach was quite rational.  The second important lesson of the 
Shaba invasions is that the maintenance of the Zairean state depended on foreign 
military intervention rather than deriving from a hypothetical national sentiment 
against the invaders.  It was the West, and not the Congolese, who rushed to the 
defense of Congo. 
The next section considers to what extent changes that have intervened in the 
international state system since the early 1990s have contributed to changing the 
parameters of political action and self-determination in Congo.  At the core of this 
investigation is the question of whether the benefits of sovereignty have been deflated 
by trends associated with globalization. 
 
 
4.  Globalization, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination 
4.1. State Dilution and Strategies of Autonomy in the Early 1990s 
After 1990, the partition of the Soviet Union and the ideological push by the West for 
the spread of electoral democracy combined to undermine the international legitimacy 
of the Mobutu regime, which was unwilling to democratize, and cast fresh doubts in 
the minds of the Congolese as to the solidity of their country’s sovereignty.  Mobutu’s 
new outcast status was a particularly important factor as it resulted in a dramatic 
collapse of aid flows to Zaire and turned the national state into a much less appealing 
stage for the acquisition of resources (Figure 1).  The perception of changing 
international norms regarding territorial integrity and the increased inability of the 
central state to transform its institutions into resources for lack of funding, led to a 
regain of autonomy-seeking activities by regional political leaders. 
  Not surprisingly, Katanga authorities were the first to make a significant 
move. On August 15, 1992, Etienne Tshisekedi of Kasai, a long-time Mobutu 
opponent, was elected prime minister by the Sovereign National Conference in 
replacement of Nguza Karl I Bond, a Lunda from Katanga related to Moïse Tshombé, 
Mobutu client, and president of the Union des Fédéralistes et Républicains 
Indépendants (UFERI).  Anti-Kasaian violence unfolded in Katanga the very next 
day.  On August 21, Nguza stated that his province did not recognize the authority of 
the new prime minister, and that Shaba as a whole was now in opposition to the 
government.  After further violence, the province's governor, Gabriel Kyungu Wa 
Kumwanza, recommended that people from Kasai living in Shaba be expelled.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS95   Page 21 
Refugees were gathered in concentration camps, awaiting repatriation to Kasai.  
Encouraged by Mobutu who wanted to weaken the prime minister appointed by the 
national conference, Nguza then vowed that there would be no national reconciliation 
with Katanga under the auspices of the current government and refused to rule out the 
possibility of a secession, saying that the course of events depended upon how far the 
national conference pushed the people of Katanga.
59  In the following months, this 
competition among national political elites via regional ethnic polarization took on an 
increasingly separatist content.  Governor Kyungu decreed in November that all 
military officers of Baluba origin had to leave Shaba and called for permanent and 
strict control of people's movements between Shaba and the two provinces of Kasai 
Occidental and Kasai Oriental.  In addition, he stressed that the top jobs in companies 
based in the region, including the copper mining company, Gécamines, should be 




Figure 1 (Source:  OECD.  Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 
Paris:  OECD, Misc. Years). 
 
This policy of ethnic cleansing eventually led to a more formal separation of 
Katanga from the rest of the country.  In December 1993, during a visit to Katanga by 
Nguza, Kyungu proclaimed his province's autonomy and announced the imposition of 
taxes at the borders.  A few days later, Nguza’s UFERI stated its unconditional 
support for the autonomy of Katanga.
61  These local leaders still recognized the 
constraints of the international sovereignty of Congo, however, and kept alive their 
options as national politicians by systematically referring to autonomy rather than 
independence.   
  This episode of near provincial self-determination illustrates the extent to 
which secessionist decisions are mostly predicated upon the strategies of elites, which 
are in turn conditioned by the international status of the state, rather than upon 
primordial identities.  It is indeed often argued that the Lundas of Katanga are 
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secessionist while the Balubakat are nationalist, based on the pattern of the 1960s 
secession, which was driven by Lunda politicians while the northern Balubakat, under 
the leadership of Jason Sendwe, chose a nationalist path behind Lumumba.  The 
events of 1992-93, however, saw an alliance of a Lunda politician, Nguza, with a 
Mulubakat, Kyungu, in favor of provincial separatism, as a consequence of their 
similar reading of the national political situation.  In the 1960s, the respective leaders 
of these two communities had made different choices, but these proceeded from their 
perceived interests rather than from different ethnic outlooks.  Similarly, it is often 
argued that Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a Mulubakat, was ready to fall back onto Katanga 
had he failed to secure his power in Kinshasa when the 1998 war unfolded.  He had 
moved the national parliament to Lubumbashi and was building a presidential palace 
in its outskirts before his assassination.  
  Kasai Oriental followed Katanga in its drive for autonomy, although its main 
politician, Etienne Tshisekedi, never played the regional separatist card but 
maintained his aspirations for the prime ministership and presidency of the country.  
The case of Kasai Oriental’s autonomy from 1993 to 1996 (and in some respects to 
1998) was then more truly an instance of a fairly homogeneous community, the 
Baluba, erecting their own institutions in the wake of the apparent collapse of the 
central state.  The main actors were the Catholic Church and MIBA, the giant 
diamond-mining company.  The role of the Shaban ethnic cleansing of 1992-94 was 
important in getting Kasai started on its own drive for autonomy.  With the influx of 
highly skilled Luba refugees, Mbuji-Mayi began to boom and MIBA’s operations 
were reinforced by all the former Gécamines engineers.  Kasai enjoyed relative 
prosperity, at least by the standards of the rest of Zaire, and developed its own 
university and a Conference for the Economic Development of Eastern Kasai 
(CODEKO), which took over regional development planning.  By refusing to 
recognize new banknotes introduced by the Kinshasa regime, Kasai essentially 
developed its own currency and exchange rate, and altogether avoided inflation while 
the rest of the country experienced price rises above 8,000% a year over the same 
period.  By 1996, Kasai had reached such a remarkable level of autonomy from 
Kinshasa that it caught the attention of The Economist:  “The province of Eastern 
Kasai is all but independent of Kinshasa [....]  Instead, it responds to two local 
powers:  the bishop and the diamond mine [….] A strong scent of independence hangs 
in the air.”
62 
Even the Kivu provinces were drifting away from the state in the early 1990s.  
“The long, slow rotting from within of Mobutu's Zaire permitted the Kivus to build a 
degree of political and economic independence during the 1980s and 1990s,” wrote 
Stephen Jackson.  “Nzoli, a senior Kivutien civil society figure told me in 1999:  ‘you 
should realize that we don't look west here, and we haven't for some time’.  ‘'West’, 
towards the capital, Kinshasa, is as far away from Goma as Poland is from Portugal.  
‘Like it or not--and many don't particularly like it these days...’ Nzoli continued, ‘... 
we look east’, over the border from Goma, towards Rwanda and Uganda.”
63   
  These experiments in autonomy came to an end with the rise of the AFDL and 
the Rwandan invasion of 1996.  Preoccupied with a regime that supported its Hutu-
based opposition, the Kigali government embarked on a military campaign that took it 
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all the way to Kinshasa for Mobutu’s overthrow.  In doing so, and given Mobutu’s 
crumbling legitimacy with Western powers save France, it restored an internationally 
recognizable authority in Kinshasa and ironically (given its own border-crossing 
origins) provided a new boost to Congo’s fledgling sovereignty.  By supporting 
Kabila as representative of Congo’s sovereignty, the international community 
contributed to putting an end to local movements of self-determination.  As a result, 
local politicians rejoined the fold of national politics (especially in Katanga where 
Balubakat now embraced Kinshasa)
64 and local experiences in state substitution (such 
as Kasai’s) folded in the face of a new imposition of state authority and renewed 
control by the state over the mining industry.   
 
4.2. The Resurrection of the Weak State  
Since the Kabila takeover of 1997, the Congolese state has successfully resisted all 
regional, international and global assaults on its existence, and has in fact continued to 
find resources for its reproduction beyond its own borders, in contrast to the 
prevailing dynamics at the beginning of the decade.  Globalization, as defined by the 
new patterns of trade, financial and information flows that followed the end of the 
Cold War, has not resulted in an erosion of either the idea of the Congolese state or its 
international sovereignty.  Processes of decision making involving the agencies of the 
state have continued to be recognized as legitimate (despite their usual neglect of the 
interests of the Congolese) while those of alternative institutions---whether rebel 
leaders, Non-Governmental Organizations, church groups or “traditional” authorities--
-have been marginalized.   Since 1997, the global system has once again come to the 
rescue of the idea of Congo while all elements on the ground militated for its 
dissolution.  As local dynamics keep on trying to erase Congo, a global logic keeps on 
bringing it back. 
  For sure, as suggested in Frances Stewart’s chapter, globalization has made 
conflict easier for political protagonists in Congo.  The informalization of 
international trade in some primary commodities, the relative impunity of border 
crossings by foreign armies, or the transnational cultural linkages derived from 
refugee movements have provided motives and means to initiate and continue 
conflict.  Yet, none of this has led to any significant movement for self-determination 
against or away from the state.  Surprisingly, for a weak state like Congo, the benefits 
of international sovereignty have not eroded in the era of globalization, guaranteeing 
the enduring appeal of the state and maintaining the prohibitive barriers to entry 
associated with self-determination options.  The following pages look at the effects on 
Congo’s reproduction of several features of the international system, addressing in 
turn the role of the United Nations, foreign aid, foreign direct investment, the 
Congolese diaspora, and regional  military and economic interventions by neighboring 
countries such as Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe.  Contrary to expectations that 
bodies such as the United Nations, “by way of military intervention and economic 
sanction, can seriously question the legitimacy of a nation-state and its ability to 
determine what occurs within its territorial boundaries,” the UN has in fact been one 
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of the the main instruments in support of Congo’s continued sovereignty.
65  It has 
repeatedly reaffirmed the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country, and its 
interventions have reinforced the state, reaffirming its existence against all empirical 
evidence on the ground.  In the 15 UN Security Council resolutions on Congo or the 
Great Lakes region passed since 1996, respect for territorial integrity was mentioned 
31 times.  The UN has also demonstrated a presumption that promoting the reach of 
the state would contribute to curing Congo’s ills, despite the evidence that the state 
fully participates in the exploitation of the country’s resources for the private gains of 
the holders of state power.  The UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of 
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
stated in its October 2002 report that a “step towards halting the exploitation of 
natural resources will be the early establishment of an all-inclusive transitional 
government […] which would ensure that central government control is reinstated” 
(p.28).  This statement came in the wake of pages of evidence related to the abuses 
and exploitation of government officials and rebels alike.  How bringing these 
together in the state would reduce rather than magnify their exploitative behavior was 
not demonstrated, nor does it make intuitive sense.  Finally, the presence of MONUC, 
the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo, in Kinshasa and across 
the country has reinforced the perception of validity of the state, no longer a decayed 
and dying system but now the local counterpart to a significant group of international 
bureaucrats and military personnel from around the world.  MONUC’s flights across 
the frontline (the only ones linking Kinshasa to rebel territories since 1998) have also 
reinforced the idea of the country (and have been used by some individuals for 
arbitrage between the foreign currency markets of Kinshasa and those of Goma and 
Kisangani).  MONUC’s initiative of sending a boat up the river from Kinshasa to 
rebel-contolled Kisangani also challenged the partition of the country.   
  Foreign aid, both bilateral and multilateral, has also contributed to reinforcing 
the reproduction of Congo since the late 1990s.  While the drying up of aid and its 
increased diversion towards non-governmental organizations in the first half of the 
decade led to centrifugal strategies by regional political elites, aid donors and 
creditors’s eagerness to cooperate with new state authorities since 1997 has brought 
many political actors back around the state, as aid resources underwrite the patron-
client relationships which define power relations throughout Congolese society.  
Kabila senior’s ideological rigidities prevented him from seizing upon these 
opportunities for renewed aid flows and he promptly alienated the World Bank, 
among others.  The new regime has been more aware of the opportunities associated 
with the resumption of development assistance.    
The incentive for nationalism implied by the quest for access to official 
development assistance has been magnified by the very public current preferences for 
territorial integrity of aid donors themselves.  Although the West punished Mobutu for 
his unruliness, it has since been willing to reward the preservation of Congo’s 
territorial integrity, putting additional pressure on Congolese politicians to play the 
Congolese game.  Participants in the Sun City Inter-Congolese Dialogue of April 
2002, for example, were made well aware of this as the government had been 
promised new aid disbursements if it came back from the Dialogue with a successful 
political settlement.  Although very partial, the eventual (and now defunct) April 2002 
power-sharing agreement between the MLC and the government was enough to 
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unleash a new round of support from the West to the central state.  The IMF’s General 
Director, Horst Köhler, visited Kinshasa barely a few days after the return of the 
government delegation in late April.  According to Congolese media, Köhler’s visit 
was a direct consequence of the Sun City agreement, a result of  
the new progress in the implementation of the Lusaka agreement and of the 
agreement reached between the government and the MLC which many other 
parties have also joined.  These are essential elements for the IMF in order to 
help the DRC and to transcend the situation that the country has known for a 
long time [….] The IMF’s Director promised to prepare the ground for integral 




This message was reinforced by the Belgian minister for foreign affairs, Louis 
Michel, also in Kinshasa in late April and according to whom, “Belgium deeply 
believes in the capacity of the Congolese to walk the path of reconciliation in order to 
open up the enormous possibilities of international aid” (emphasis mine).
67  Hence, it 
came as no surprise to the Congolese when the IMF apparently announced that it 
would consider a 3-year multi-sector emergency program for Congo with 
disbursements estimated at $700m (though this would probably be conditional upon 
the DRC paying its arrears to the Fund).  During a March 2002 mission to the DRC, 
the IMF had linked the participation of the international financial community in the 
DRC to progress in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
68  The World Bank was the first 
one to go from words to deeds, however, as it signed a $454m credit agreement with 
the government in Kinshasa on May 4, 2002, as partial funding for the three-year 
“multi-sector emergency rehabilitation and reconstruction program,” most of which 
was earmarked for infrastructure.  Apparently, the World Bank had also agreed to a 
$45m budgetary aid to the government a week earlier.
69   
By and large, therefore, the embrace of the state or its rejection through 
separatism and rebellion are partly a function of the capacity of the sovereign state to 
deliver the resources of foreign aid to Congolese political elites and their followers.  
Whereas, in the early 1990s, the West conditioned this marketability of sovereignty to 
democratic progress, it is now content to reserve it to those willing to preserve the 
state.  The Congolese adjust their political strategies accordingly.  The abandonment 
by the government of its political agreement with the MLC after a few months in 2002 
demonstrated the aid instrumentality of such accords.  Once aid commitments had 
been made in the mild enthusiasm that followed the Sun City agreement, there was no 
longer any incentive for Kinshasa elites to share power in a government of national 
unity.  Nationalism was thus a tactical move for access to foreign resources via the 
state.  Table 1 illustrates the extent to which self-determination instances, defined as 
secession attempts or major rebellions, respond to these incentives of aid.  Looking at 
all years since 1960, it shows that aid disbursements have been significantly lower on 
average in years preceding separatist or rebellious activity than in years preceding 
instances of social peace, suggesting that Congolese elites adjust their behavior to the 
economic returns of sovereignty.  The correlation between foreign aid and instances 
of rebelliosn and secession lagged by one year is an astounding r=-.43. 
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Table 1.  Foreign Aid, Secessions and Rebellions 
 
Average annual aid disbursements (in million current US$) 
  In years preceding secession attempts or rebellions (n=14)    257.3 
  In other years (n=23)              519.3 
 
t = 2.794; P > t (one-tailed) = 0.0042 
 
Source:  OECD.  Geographical Distribution of Aid Flows… Misc. years.  Aid data 
missing for 1968. 
 
  Of particular significance to the argument here is the fact that foreign aid has 
not undermined the state in recent years.  Although aid dried up in the 1990s 
compared to earlier decades, this was linked to Mobutu’s declining popularity abroad 
and to Kabila’s inept leadership.  While using a “civil society” discourse and 
highlighting their interests in non-governmental organizations, donors remained eager 
to provide aid to the state per se and made their preference known to Congolese 
political actors.  Therefore, even though aid inflows and commitments remained 
minimal from the early 1990s until 2002, the aid message changed significantly after 
the death of Mobutu and discouraged political entrepreneurs seeking non-state 
avenues of action.  The resumption of macroeconomic program lending under Joseph 
Kabila virtually brought the state back to solvent life.
70  Paradoxically, the allocation 
of foreign aid to sovereign states is to some extent a post-cold-war feature.  During 
the cold war, aid was more easily given to rebel groups when they rose against clients 
of the other super-power.  Congo’s rebel groups are therefore casualties of the 
unipolar world in their failure to be seen as worthy recipients of non-humanitrian aid.  
This is one more dimension in which the globalized world helps reproduce the nation-
state more than was true under Col-War conditions.   
  Similarly to foreign aid, investments too are conditional upon 
territorial integrity if only to the extent that integrity provides sovereignty which in 
turn opens up avenues of insurance and arbitration for foreign investors.  Despite all 
the talk about the informalization, if not criminalization, of international transactions 
in the wake of globalization, sovereignty has remained a crucial parameter for foreign 
investors in Congo.  Very few agreements were made between foreign companies and 
the AFDL in the 1996-1997 period before the overthrow of Mobutu, and the few that 
were made occurred at a time when its eventual victory and control of the sovereign 
state was no longer in doubt.  Similarly, hardly any foreign investment has taken place 
since 1998 in rebel-controlled territories, apart from those of sovereign actors 
themselves, such as Rwanda, Uganda, and the companies linked to their political 
elites. 
Much noise was made in April 1997 of the financial agreement signed in the 
middle of that month between Kabila’s AFDL and Jean-Raymond Boulle’s American 
Mineral Fields (AMF), an Arkansas-based company listed on the Toronto stock 
exchange.
71  The agreement, which involved construction of a copper and cobalt 
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treatment plant in Kolwezi ($200-$220m), the rehabilitation of a cobalt plant at 
Kipushi ($30m) and the building of a zinc production plant also at Kipushi ($550-
650m), was generally seen as a case of international investors dealing with a warlord 
to exploit local natural resources (an idea fostered by the fact that Boulle frequently 
let Kabila fly in his private jet).  Yet, as mentioned earlier, this agreement occurred 
only one month before the fall of Kinshasa, and not before both Lubumbashi and 
Mbuji-Mayi had fallen into AFDL hands, sealing the fate of the Mobutu government.  
In essence, AMF was dealing with a future sovereign entity, beating the AFDL’s 
formal control of the state by a few weeks in order to guarantee better access to its 
market.
72  Nor was AMF alone at the time.  Whereas no investment deals had been 
struck between the AFDL and foreign companies since the beginning of the rebellion 
in August 1996, Africa Research Bulletin spoke of a “race for concessions” in its 
April-May 1997 issue.  After the fall of Lubumbashi on April 11, foreign operators, 
reassured that the AFDL would soon inherit sovereign power, came in droves, as the 
AFDL began “negotiating the calls for tenders on mining contracts.” In addition to 
AMF, Anglo American (a South African company) also tendered at the beginning of 
April for two projects with Gécamines (the exploitation of the Ruashi-Etoile copper 
field near Lubumbashi and a joint venture with Union Minière for a waste 
reprocessing plant at Kolwezi).  Other South African groups, including diamond giant 
De Beers and Johannesburg Consolidated Investments sent delegations to 
Lubumbashi in April.  Earlier in the month, Adolf Lundin of Canada’s Eurocan had 
visited Kabila in Goma to discuss investments at Tenke Fungurume in Katanga.
73   
Foreign companies were also still dealing with Mobutu up until early 1997, 
several months after the beginning of the AFDL rebellion, at a time when most of the 
east of the country was already firmly beyond the physical reach of the state.  On 
November 20, 1996, for example, the same Eurocan Ventures whose CEO visited 
Kabila in Goma in April 1997, had announced the signing of an investment 
convention with Gécamines together with a fiscal agreement with the Mobutu 
government, according to which Eurocan was to acquire a 55% participation in the 
Tenke Fungurume mine in exchange for $250m.  The Tenke Mining Corporation, a 
joint venture of Gécamines and Eurocan, was set up on that occasion and committed 
to realize a feasibility study.
74  Similarly, Banro Resource Corporation signed a 
mining convention with the Zairean government as late as January 1997, setting up a 
new company, the Société Aurifère du Kivu et Maniéma (SAKIMA), of which Banro 
owned 93% and Zaire 7%, in exchange for a $15m investment.
75   
Since 1998, the RCD-Goma and MLC rebel organizations have not 
demonstrated more success in attracting and obtaining foreign investments in the 
territories under their control.
76  In fact, a review of all issues of Africa Research 
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Bulletin:  Economic, Financial and Technical Series, from late 1998 to the end of 
2001, revealed only one international transaction between the RCD and a foreign 
company, the First International Bank of Grenada (FIBG), which, as discussed earlier, 
did not reach fruitful completion.  In contrast, Heritage Oil, a Canadian company, 
announced in June 2002 that it would soon begin drilling in eastern Congo, in 
territories broadly under Ugandan control. This announcement occurred, however, 
after rebel leaders Jean-Pierre Bemba and Mbusa Nyamwisi started negotiating with 
the Kinshasa government for a coalition government, and received the approval of the 
government.  Like the AMF deal in 1996, it represents therefore a case of anticipation 
of government sovereignty, rather than a pure deal with rebel authorities.
77   
The interests of risk-minimizing foreign investors reinforce the incentives for 
territorial integrity and those for the preservation of international sovereignty faced by 
the Congolese.  While the informalization of trade and investment relations over the 
last decade has made it easier for foreign investors to strike individual deals with local 
strongmen and eschew the state and national regulations, they have continued to 
prefer trading and investing with local counterparts who can avail themselves of the 
mantel of state sovereignty, because sovereignty mitigates some of the risks they face 
and compares favorably to the uncertainty associated with dealing with warlords.
78   
  More important than private foreign entrepreneurs have been the sovereign 
foreign investors who have operated in both rebel- and government-controlled 
territories since 1998.  Rwanda has been actively exploiting the resources of the 
provinces formally under the control of RCD-Goma.  In 1999, it was estimated to 
have grossed some $320m from its operations in Congo.
79  Ugandan forces have 
helped themselves to the resources of eastern Orientale province which has come 
under the alternating political control of Bemba’s MLC and Mbusa Nyamwisi’s RCD-
Mouvement de Libération.  Zimbabwe, meanwhile, has established economic control 
over the Kasai provinces and much of Katanga’s mineral deposit areas.  In the 
Kasaian capital of Mbuji-Mayi, Zimbabwean troops until recently physically occupied 
the alluvial mining grounds of the formally state-controlled diamond company MIBA.  
In Katanga, a Zimbabwean, Billy Rautenbach, was appointed director of the mining 
giant Gécamines from 1998 to 1999.   Despite their general disregard for Congo’s 
integrity and their undermining of its effective sovereignty over its natural resources, 
these strategies of “resource colonization” by regional power have not promoted 
separatist, irredentist or other movements of self-determination.
80  Despite the 
reorientation of their economic links with the southern African region, Katanga and 
the Kasais have remained firmly anchored under Congolese government control.  
And, in the east, neither Rwanda nor Uganda has tried to parlay its economic 
exploitation into a reconfiguration of state structures. 
  The reasons for the simultaneous persistence of the Congolese state with its 
economic dismemberment vary from region to region.  Their common feature, 
however, is that the preservation of the state is always an essential component of the 
profit-maximization strategies of the main protagonists.  In the case of Rwanda and 
Uganda, the essential feature of their economic exploitation of Congo is its direct 
nature.  The Rwandan Patriotic Army and the Ugandan People Defense Forces 
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operate directly in Congolese territory and their private partners tend to be Rwandan 
and Ugandan businesses.  Both the Congolese state and the rebel authorities are 
bypassed in these deals.  In fact, the recent Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts… 
does not single out a single rebel leader in the foreign exploitation of Congo’s natural 
resources, in contrast to the numerous government figures.  It is not that rebel 
strongmen do not exploit their region of political control.  They do.  Rather, it is that 
their strategies of exploitation are not integrated with those of the occupying forces 
and are, in fact, residual to the latter.  In the late 1990s, for example, it was estimated 
that two thirds of the output of coltan from the Kivu provinces was directly flown to 
Rwanda from the digging sites, while the RCD-Goma was left to scramble for control 
and taxing of the remainder of the production.
81   
  The direct economic exploitation of Rwanda and Uganda has had two 
consequences.  First, neither Kigali nor Kampala has wished to encourage the 
institutional development of their respective Congolese rebel counterparts, as their 
direct exploitation benefits from the absence of capable institutions.  A weak 
Congolese state and weak rebel groups, unable to effectively assert their territorial and 
administrative controls, provide optimal conditions for the Rwandan and Ugandan 
economic strategies.
82  As a result, these rebel movements have not taken on the 
proto-state characteristics typical of self-determination movements, nor have they 
developed political agendas of state substitution.  Second, the direct exploitation of 
Congo’s eastern region by Rwandans and Ugandans has triggered a nationalist 
reaction by local populations which has made it all but impossible for any rebel 
authority to develop a separatist agenda.  In the case of Rwanda, the unique 
combination of economic reorientation of the Kivu provinces and of the ethnic 
similarities between the Congolese rebel leadership and the Kigali ruling elite has not 
therefore led to the often feared and denounced irredentist scenario.  Rwanda’s 
transnational cultural linkages with the Banyarwanda populations of eastern Congo 
have not resulted in a common economic and political agenda.  The Congolese 
Banyamulenge have, by and large, been manipulated by Rwandan authorities.  
Increasingly aware of this, some of them, under the leadership of former RCD-Goma 
Commandant Masunzu, actually joined resistance movements to the Rwandan 
occupation in March 2002.   
  In the case of the Zimbabwean occupation of the mineral areas of Kasai and 
Katanga, there has been systematic collaboration with members of the Congolese 
government in the exploitation of Congo’s natural resources.  These formal “joint 
ventures” between the Congolese state and Zimbabwean entrepreneurs have put a 
premium on the reproduction of the weak state in these regions.  For the Congolese 
elites, the weak state facilitates the conversion of their formal public functions into 
private gains.  For the Zimbabweans, it provides a seal of legality to their business 
deals.  The economic appetites of Congolese and Zimbabwean political elites account 
therefore for much of the Congolese institutional rigidity, in contrast to the business 
informality and criminalization that prevail on the ground.  
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  While the economic interests of the Zimbabwean regime in intervening in the 
DRC are now well known,
83 lesser know until the recent publication of the Final 
Report of the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, were the 
advantages that the Congolese government and elites derived from it, aside from the 
defense of the country’s territorial integrity.  The economic activities of Zimbabwe 
and the Zimbabwean armed forces in Congo are generally run as joint ventures with 
Congolese government elites.  The Zimbabweans benefit from the legal status of their 
official state partners, while the Congolese convert their official functions into rental 
havens.  Both groups benefit therefore from the maintenance of the state, and 
Zimbabwe, particularly, does not have any incentive to promote the rise or regional 
identities in support of its economic network in southern Congo.  On the contrary, it 
finds more merit in dealing with a sovereign state.    
  With great irony and a profound understanding of the benefits of sovereingty, 
the company set up by the Zimbabwean armed forces to represent its commercial 
operations in Congo is called Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (OSLEG).  Since 1998, 
it has entered into several joint ventures with another paragon of state deception, 
Comiex-Congo, a firm partly owned by the family of Joseph Kabila and set up by his 
father.  Together OSLEG and COMIEX have created a Congolese subsidiary named 
COSLEG.  COSLEG, in turn, is behind SOCEBO, the biggest ever logging operation 
in the history of Congo, which was granted an 85m-acre concession by the Congolese 
government in August 2001.
84  In other words, Zimbabwe’s military intervention in 
defense of the the Congolese state has generated opportunities for Congolese and 
Zimbabwean elites to convert state control and state assets into private profiteering 
opportunities.
85 It is the very weakness of the state that made it vulnerable to foreign 
aggression by Rwanda and Uganda and justified Zimbabwean intervention.  It is its 
very sovereignty that allows for this conversion of defense policy into private profit.   
  The Congolese are not helpless exploited victims in this arrangement.  
Zimbabwe extracts in fact a very little price from them for its intervention.  The 
Congolese political elite could not indeed set up investment operations of a sufficient 
scale on their own to exploit many of the natural resources of Katanga or Kasai.  Their 
joint ventures with Zimbabwe allow them to privately realize gains from their legal 
control of state assets that they could not otherwise exploit.  Hence, OSLEG’s 
operations also benefit COMIEX.  This is not only true in the case of SOCEBO’s 
timber business, but also applies to Sengamines, another joint venture between 
OSLEG and COMIEX.  In 2000, Sengamines was awarded Miba’s alluvial deposits 
of diamonds at Senga-Senga and its kimberlite mine at Tshibwe, in a government-
mandated transfer from Miba.
86 
  More often than not, Congolese elites have the upper hand in these business 
deals, and extract immediate resources from the Zimbabweans.  The agreement with 
Zimbabwe’s Rautenbachfor example, was that “Gécamines’ core mineral assets 
[were] assigned to Rautenbach’s Ridgepointe [company], in which Congolese officials 
have an equity stake” (emphasis mine).
87  It was apparently because the Congolese 
government was not getting as much as it hoped from its deal with Zimbabwe that 
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Billy Rautenbach got sacked from running Gécamines in November 1999 after having 
been appointed in November 1998.  For sure, the appointment of Rautenbach was 
supposed to benefit Zimbabwe, both directly and through the percentage of the 
government share that was earmarked for reimbursement of military spending and 
loans by Zimbabwe.  But there still remained a substantial part of revenues that was 
supposed to accrue to the Congolese government.  According to Africa Research 
Bulletin, Rautenbach was let go because Congolese “ministers criticize[d] 
Rautenbach’s management of state-owned Gécamines for not generating enough 
revenue for the government.”   
  While the rules of the post-cold-war era in Africa have facilitated the violation 
of boundaries, a once sacro-sanct principle of inter-state relations in Africa, they have 
not promoted a redefinition of nation-states.  The cases of Ugandan, Rwandan and 
Zimbabwean interventions in Congo demonstrate indeed the extent to which the 
violation of the state’s territorial integrity combines with the preservation of its 
sovereign shell to generate unusually profitable conditions for both invading and 
invaded political elites.   
  After the UN system, aid donors, foreign investors and regional powers, the 
existence of a Congolese diaspora could also constitute a potentially important factor 
in affecting the formation, spread and consolidation of sub-national identities and self-
determination movements in Congo, not least because diasporae often serve as both 
cultural and financial vectors for local identities.  This is not the case in Congo, 
however.  According to Michael Schatzberg, writing in 1990, Congolese “external 
opposition is insignificant [….] Living for the most part in Brussels and Paris, broad 
coalitions of exiles spend as much time squabbling with each other as they do 
opposing Mobutu.”
88  The same is very much true today vis-à-vis the Kabila regime.  
Although the Congolese diaspora in Belgium and France has a relatively high cultural 
profile, it is neither politically unified, nor does it represent one region or ethnic group 
more than another.  For a while, under Mobutu, the Kasai regions were probably more 
represented in the diaspora, but their nationalist profile (due to the penetration of 
Kasaian educated elites in most other regions, a consequence of colonial policy) 
restrained them from articulating self-determination agendas.  The neo-patrimonial 
logic of rule also made many of them await their turn to integrate or re-integrate the 
state system.  For those who remained on the outside during the entire Mobutu years, 
the arrival of Kabila’s regime in 1997 represented a new opportunity to join the state.  
Much of the AFDL leadership and subsequent Kabila governments were indeed 
composed of Congoese from abroad.  The Congolese diapora has also been formally 
represented in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue that has been going on (and off) since 
1999.  In short, the devotion to the Congolese state applies to the diaspora s much as 
to those who have remained in Congo.  This is considerably different from cases like 
Sri Lanka or Somalia where ethnically homogeneous diasporae have maintained the 
spirit of regional self-determination movements alive and financed their war efforts.
89  
The Congolese diaspora also differs from these two other cases by its origins, for it is 
not the result of people seeking refuge from conflict or group persecution.  Rather it 
consists of political opponents, young future elites educated in Western universities 
and awaiting propitious conditions for their return, or traders.  The former two have a 
vested interest in maintaining the state.  As for the latter, Janet McGaffey and Rémy 
Bazenguissa-Ganga have suggested, in their study of these international trader 
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communities, that these people have created ‘a world of their own in which they reject 
both legal economic activity and the value system of society in which they carry out 
their extra-legal activities.”
90 Yet, these traders directly benefit from the weak state 
too, as it allows them to bypass controls and regulations.  Their resistance to the state, 
if any, is therefore essentially passive and does not constitute the foundation of an 
alternative identity.  Nor do remittances from Congolese abroad seem to support the 
political mobilization of any specific group in Congo.  According to a study by 
Claude Sumata, remittances from Congolese abroad have in fact alleviated poverty in 
Congo and facilitated local entrepreneurial activity, by and large contribution to a 
reduction in economic grievances against the state and providing the latter with an 
additional safety valve.
91  
The only significant potential diasporic opposition, organized along ethnic 
lines and displaying historical grievances vis-à-vis the state, is the Katanga Tigres and 
the related structures of political authority among the Lunda of Angola, Zambia and 
Katanga. The Tigres of the Front National de Libération du Congo (FNLC) are the 
descendants to the Katanga Gendarmes, the troops that fought for the secession of the 
province from 1960 to 1963.  After their defeat by UN forces in 1963, the Katanga 
Gendarmes, mainly composed of ethnic Lundas, fled to the Lunda provinces of 
Angola.  Many came back to serve in the national army of Congo in 1964-65, when 
Moïse Tshombé was prime minister, but his waning political fortunes later led to their 
repression and they again sought the path of exile.  When Angola became independent 
in 1975, they began serving as a paramilitary force for the ruling MPLA and 
contributed to repelling the Zairean-FNLA invasion of July 1975.  The MPLA used 
them thereafter to protect its borders from UNITA incursions, to guard diamond 
mines, and in special operations such as the war in Congo Brazzaville in 1997, 
maintaining them as a quasi mercenary force, a sort of Légion étrangère out of special 
extra-budgetary accounts.  They contributed to the AFDL war in 1996 but were 
apparently disenchanted by the nature of their integration in the Congolese army and 
Rwandan control over the armed forces, and made once again the trek back to Angola.  
They are currently estimated to number between 5,000 and 7,000.
92   
Because of Angola’s support for the current Congolese regime and the end of 
its own civil war in 2002, the question of the status of the Tigres has taken on a new 
salience recently.  Both government have been discussing a possible reintegration of 
the Tigres into Congo’s army.  Symptomatically of the Congolese political system, 
the Tigres’ own political agenda no longer involves a particular political project 
besides rejoining the fold of the state on acceptable terms, despite their numerous 
years in exile and their nature as an armed Lunda diaspora.  Angola has apparently put 
pressure on the Congolese authorities for granting them land and decent pay (they 
reportedly make $200 a month in Angola, which compares with about $10 a month 
for Congolese troops).  But they appear to have no other political ambitions and to no 
longer conceive of their self-determination away from the state. In fact, their main 
political leaders, including Nathan Mbumba who was in charge of their invasions of 
Shaba in 1977 and 1978, and their current secretary-general Henri Muka Tshung, live 
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in Kinshasa.  They are trying to parlay their military leverage into access to the state, 
irrespective of their past issues of cultural specificity.  The collaboration of the Lunda 
emperor, the Mwaant Yaav, with the past and present regimes (both of which have 
repressed Lunda political aspirations), currently as a member of parliament, follows 
the same logic of exchanging local power (based on tradition rather than force in this 
case) for access to a parcel of state resources.  It is the only reasonable option 
available to these political actors, if they wish to maximize power and resources, as a 
result of the development of the centralized state as the most profitable avenue to 
resources.   
This also explains why the reinsertion of the Tigres is such a crucial question 
for the government at this stage as they could revert to violence to negotiate a better 
deal for themselves if current talks fail.  They are rumored indeed to have been 
approached by Katebe Katoto, a Katangan businessman of mixed Congolese and 
Greek descent, who has declared his ambitions for the presidency, but who will most 
likely find his mixed racial background to be an obstacle to his political aspirations, 
making him likely to seek an alliance with the Tigres to pursue his goal militarily.  At 
any rate, the contemporary behavior of groups that should be most associated with the 
separatist idea illustrates the rationality of the nationalist preference for power and 
resource maximizers.   
The findings from this section suggest that global cultural and economic 
influences have failed to affect the benefits of sovereignty and the subsequent 
nationalist calculus of Congolese elites.  The global norm that whatever political 
authority inherits the postcolonial African state is automatically imbued with 
international sovereignty, whereas secessionist governments are not, remains the most 
important cultural flow in shaping the contours of struggles of self-determination in 
Congo.  Hence, the paradox that a state as culturally heterogeneous, resource-rich, and 
grossly malevolent as Congo does not generate credible self-determination 
movements but produces instead an apparently irrational nationalist fervor.  As the 
previus evidence suggests, the irony of Congolese nationalism and of its anti-partition 
discourse is that they set the stage and provide the mechanism for the private 
dismemberment of Congo’s assets.  Congo is maintained so that it can be emptied of 
its substance.  But then, how does Congo’s cultural diversity express itself?  Where do 
sub-national identities find cultural and political outlets? 
 
5. Why Ethnic Salience Does not Translate in Ethnic Self-Determination  
Strategies of state-as-resource, whether instrumental or intrinsic, and their attendant 
nationalist expressions, preclude the voicing of local cultural identities, which are then 
left to find outlets in demands for federalism and in “tribal” clientelism, 
differentiation and polarization.  The popular “flow and closure” argument, according 
to which the uncertainties of globalized flows lead to the reinforcement of local 
identities as closure mechanisms, does not quite apply in Congo.
93  On the contrary, it 
is the incentive for the maintenance of the Congolese state, rather than its dilution 
through global informal markets, that leads to the perpetuation and magnification of 
parochial identities.  Nationalism dialectically generates ethnicity.   
  For the Congolese, the demand for federalism is an expression of identity 
differences that remains within the realm of the politically feasible, as opposed to 
separatism.  It represents an attempt to reconcile the existence of Congo with 
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aspirations for emancipation from its domination.  As such, federalism is usually 
popular with public opinion and with opposition politicians (who perceive it as an 
opportunity to play a local power card without threatening the overall system and 
losing the benefits associated with sovereignty).  Indeed, every time the Congolese 
have an opportunity to express themselves in relatively non-threatening environments, 
they voice their desire for federalism.  This was the case at the Table-Ronde in 
Brussels in 1960, though colonial influence managed to maintain a dose of unitarism 
in the system.  The Antananarivo Conference of March 1961 resulted in a proposal for 
a loose confederation in which each province was largely autonomous but under one 
foreign policy.  It happened again in 1964 with the never-implemented Luluabourg 
Constitution, which created 22 quasi-federated provinces.  The 1992 Sovereign 
National Conference also overwhelmingly approved federalism for Congo. 
Yet, once in power, politicians typically repress such aspirations in order to 
avoid any dilution of their authority and the rise of independent sources of 
institutional power, and instead impose unitary structures, usually with the support of 
western donors.  As a Katangan informant put it, “Quand on va manger à Kinshasa, 
c'est fini."
94  Lumumba in 1960, Mobutu in 1965, and Kabila in 1997 all proceeded 
from the same logic of power and tried to put an end to democratic expressions of 
cultural differences in Congo.  Popular attitudes adjust to these realities of power.  
Whereas pro-federalist attitudes are the default among the Congolese, these 
preferences are usually toned down when central authority is effective or at least able 
to marginalize any federalist discourse.  Since the beginning of the latest war, in 1998, 
successive Congolese governments have also successfully associated demands for 
federalism with separatist agendas, with the consequence that outspoken federalists---
as the RCD-Goma and its feared “provincial assemblies”---are now labeled anti-
Congo.  As a consequence, pro-federalist sentiments in Kinshasa’s public opinion 
polls have fallen from 41% in May 1998, to 33% in December 2000, and 23% in 
January 2002.
95  The politically acceptable discourse now, even among opponents and 
members of civil society, calls for federalism after the hypothetical transition from the 
current regime to a reunified Congo with a democratically elected government, or for 
a “unitary but strongly decentralized system,” as the expression goes. 
  The elusiveness of the federal option has stifled the expression of local 
identities and relegated them to parallel social networks which the nationalist 
discourse stigmatizes as “tribalistic” and which, while serving the interests of their 
members, fail to translate their aspirations into a self-determination project, 
converting them instead into parochial strategies of access to state power and 
resources.  Such strategies imply either a dynamic process of identity differentiation 
as justification for claims to participate in the system, or a process of polarization of 
local groups as they compete for state-controlled resources.  Paradoxically, then, the 
very centralization of the nationalist state triggers local dynamics of ethnic 
differentiation and polarization that lead to ever narrower definitions of identity.   
  The Chokwe of Katanga illustrate the logic of ethnic differentiation.  The 
Chokwe, who originate in Angola, spread through the south-western region of 
Katanga in the 18
th century and eventually became geographically and culturally close 
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to the Lunda with whom they have considerable spatial overlap and similar interests.
96  
Yet, while some Chokwe participated with the Lunda in CONAKAT in the 1960s, 
most of them chose  to stay away from the Lunda-dominated party and instead 
marked their difference by joining the nationalist Balubakat-dominated Cartel 
Katangais as part of ATCAR, the Alliance des Tshokwé du Congo, Angola et 
Rhodésie.  Although both the Lunda and the Chokwe are now politically marginalized 
and suffer from the hegemony of the Balubakat in Katanga, the Chokwe have 
continued their policy of self-dissociation from the Lunda while the latter, who benefit 
from greater recognition and whose emperor is a member of parliament, claim to have 
traditional authority over the Chokwe.
97  It makes sense for the Lunda, who have 
some limited access to power, to claim representation of the Chokwe so as to increase 
their demographic weight and consequent demands on state resources.  For Chokwe 
elites, on the other hand, it equally makes sense to reinforce their groups’ cultural 
difference so as to seize control of their own representation and bypass the local 
mediation of the Lunda in their access to state resources.   
The current socio-political organization of the Chokwe in Katanga reflects this 
strategy of ethnic differentiation as a clientelistic organizational principle for access to 
networks of power and resources.  Like many other Congolese groups, the Chokwe 
are organized in a mutual welfare society, the Mutuelle Culturelle Kulivwa.  This 
association is not to be confused with a traditional organization, and Chokwe chiefs 
are not represented in its structures.  Rather, it is a cultural association of modern 
elites, a lobbying organization for the betterment of mostly urbanized and educated 
individuals sharing Chokwe cultural identity.  Its leadership is composed of a lecturer 
at the University of Lubumbashi, two managers at Gécamines, a lawyer and former 
minister of Mines under Mobutu currently setting up a new political party, a retired 
civil servant, the former director of Katanga’s central prison under Moise Tshombe, 
and a former secretary of the Ministry of Interior under Mobutu.
98  In other words, 
these are either former political elites, sidelined by current power configurations, or 
economic elites suffering from the marginalization of Katanga’s main parastatals.  
Either way, they are relative outcasts of the system, suffering from a loss of political 
access.  The Mutuelle is their organizational response to this loss, and it is based on 
ethnic solidarity and on the reinforcement of the projection of their cultural identity, 
mostly in the form of differentiation from the Lunda. This organization is essentially 
clientelistic as the Mutuelle structures its members’ access to state resource as a 
group.  It negotiates and lobbies for their participation in the system, but does not 
challenge it.  As its leadership affirms,  
given the weakness of the state, people fall back on tribal associations.  The 
Mutuelle brings us all together now in mutual solidarity [entraide], cultural 
preservation, and defense of our interests.  The Mutuelle is a member of the 
Fondation Katangaise, a grouping of mutuelles from the province.  The 
Fondation is a reconciliation institution, which helps mediate between 
different associations [….] It also intervenes for pressuring authorities into 
appointing our members.
99   
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Mediation is necessary among the Mutuelles to the extent that they compete for the 
same state-sponsored resources, chiefly among which is public employment.  This 
competition leads to increased cultural differentiation among these groups and 
undermines national and provincial identities.  As part of this strategy of cultural 
differentiation, Kulivwa has sponsored the writing of a book on the history of the 
Chokwe people and is planning a Chokwe museum.
100  The book and the museum 
project are part of an effort of cultural preservation, a reinvention and imagination of 
Chokwe identity in today’s Congo.  
Yet, Kulivwa does not stand in opposition to the state as an organization of 
alternative action.  It does not promote the political expression of Chokwe identity as 
a matter of cultural self-determination.  On the contrary, its members all individually 
operate in the margins of state power.  Rather than affirming their existence as a 
group vis-à-vis the state, as would a self-determination movement, they do so vis-à-
vis other local groups in order to single out the merits of their claims to association 
with the state.  For the Chokwe, the main competitor are the Lunda, which are often 
believed to be an umbrella group exerting authority over them.  The writing of its 
history by the Chokwe is an exercise in denying this assimilation.  “The way history 
was written before is like a type of repression,” complain the members of Kulivwa.  
“Our history is always drowned in that of the Lunda.”
101  The book stresses that the 
Chokwe are not under the authority of the Lunda’s Mwaant Yav and recounts how, in 
1885, they even captured the Mwaant Yav's capital city.  It also offers a chronology of 
the Chokwe chiefs and attempts to belittle the reach of Lunda authority by arguing 
that Angola’s Lunda are in fact a different group (another instance of self-
differentiation as the Chokwe themselves originated in Angola).  
This pattern of cultural self-affirmation aimed at other groups rather than at 
the state simultaneously reinforces the continued existence of the weak state and 
promotes parochial polarization.  Tribalism and the state are thus reproduced at the 
same time.  The Chokwe are but one example of this phenomenon.  Across Congo, 
mutuelles are the expressions of the clientelistic dimension of tribalisme, its 
institutionalized façade, as they offer their support to politicians in exchange for the 
redistribution of state resources to their members.  According to Maurice Etukomalu, 
chair of the Topoke’s Isonga-Songa Mutuelle in Orientale Province, “Any politician 
who wants a solid foundation has to go through us.” Just as Kulivwa is complacent 
vis-à-vis the state, Isonga-Songa does not challenge the rule of the RCD-Goma in 
Kisangani.  On the contrary, they see the rebels as their pathway to the spoils of 
power and simply ask to be taken into account:  "We are a force capable of giving a 
foundation to the RCD."
102  
  In other instances, however, ethnic identities lead to more violent polarization.  
This is usually the case when scarcities are more pronounced, as in the Kivu regions 
where demographic pressures were compounded by refugee flows from Rwanda in 
the 1990s.  Rapid population growth led to difficult issues of land allocation, 
particularly critical in this agricultural region.  The identity problem in Eastern Congo 
has already been well researched.
103  The questions to be addressed here are the 
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relationship between the reproduction of the national state and ethnic violence in the 
Kivus and the degree to which this ethnic violence can be associated with attempts at 
political self-determination. 
Although identity relations in Eastern Congo are very complex and cannot be 
collapsed into a single explanatory framework, political violence in the Kivus is at 
least partly about access to state power, and less about cultural self-determination than 
may appear at first.  The Congolese Tutsi known as the Banyamulenge are fighting for 
their reinsertion into the Congolese political system, from which they were originally 
outcast under the Mobutu regime.  While the Congolese authorities’ attitude towards 
the Banyamulenge derive in large part from regional politics, and particularly from 
Congo’s relations with Rwanda and Uganda, the Banyamulenge’s own agenda 
remains overwhelmingly domestic and parallels but does not equate the struggle of 
the Rwandan Tutsi against the remnants of the Hutu-based Habyarimana regime.  
Transnational linkages and cultural similarities do not translate into irredentism or 
other forms of attempts at self-determination for the Congolese Tutsi.  Rather, the 
appeal of the state remains the prevalent motivation, focusing their struggle on the 
question of citizenship and linking local violence with moments of power 
redistribution in Kinshasa. 
There are essentially two types of Banyarwanda in the Kivus.   One group is 
constituted of the descendants of individuals---both Hutus and Tutsis---who migrated 
and settled there before or during Belgian colonization.  A second group is composed 
mostly of the Tutsi (and their children) who escaped the Hutu revolution in Rwanda in 
1959.  A 1972 law conferred Congolese citizenship to Banyarwanda who had been in 
Congo since 1950, leaving the second group as foreigners.  In 1981, however, a new 
law stripped all Banyarwanda of their citizenship, apparently as a consequence of the 
declining influence of the Banyamulenge in the Mobutu administration.
104  This law 
was confirmed in the early 1990s by the transition parliament appointed by the 
National Sovereign Conference.  The situation at the beginning of the 1990s was thus 
characterized by a fragilization of the status of the Banyarwanda in Eastern Congo, a 
demotion among Congolese society characterized by their exclusion from the state 
system.  Earlier in the decade, many among the last wave of Tutsi immigrants had 
returned to Rwanda or Uganda to join the Rwandan Patriotic Front in its civil war 
against the Habyarimana regime, somehow solving their own citizenship problem.  
The long-term Banyarwanda of the Kivus, however, were left vulnerable as outsiders 
to the Congolese political system.  
With the approaching possibility of elections---and, hence, of redistribution of 
access to state power---, ethnic-based mobilization increased in the Kivus in the early 
1990s, mainly along the axis of “autochthonous” populations (such as the Hunde, 
Nande, Nyanga) against Banyarwanda “outsiders.” Violence flared up in the Walikale 
and Masisi regions of North Kivu in 1992 and 1993 and partly represented an attempt 
by these “autochthonous” groups to further marginalize the Banyarwanda (already 
deprived of access to the state by their loss of citizenship) and eliminate them as a 
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contender for land resources.  “Heavily armed ex-soldiers” were reported to organize 
“tribal groups” which moved “from village to village, killing and looting” the 
Banyarwanda.  The relative prosperity of the land-owning Banyarwanda and their 
outnumbering of autochthonous populations in parts of North Kivu (Masisi and 
Rutshuru) lied behind the violence, which was made possible---if not encouraged---by 
the decay of the state security apparatus at the time.
105   
The influx of Hutu refugees from Rwanda in 1994 transformed the dyadic 
“autochthonous”-Banyarwanda conflict into a tryadic relationship in which Hutu 
refugees coalesced with local Hutu populations against both autochthonous and Tutsi.  
It also dragged the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government into Kivu politics and 
created a de facto alliance between this government and the Congolese Tutsi against 
the Hutu refugee populations.  Yet, the decision by the Banyamulenge to resort to 
arms in 1996 was directed first and foremost against the attempts by local Congolese, 
not Hutu refugees, to dispossess them.
106  Right before the 1996 war began, the then 
deputy-governor of South Kivu had asked all Banyamulenge to leave the country 
"within six days of be attacked and killed.”
107  One would be mistaken, therefore, to 
equate the intentions of the Congolese Tutsi with those of the Rwandan regime, 
although both found merits in resorting to violence in the Kivu provinces at around 
the same time in 1996.  Yet, what the Banyamulenge wanted was to re-establish by 
force their local economic rights, and to install a government in Kinshasa that would 
solve their citizenship problem.  Irredentism with Rwanda or the creation of a 
“Tutsiland” in the Kivus, while ubiquitous scarecrows in Kivu’s political discourse, 
were not on the agenda of the Congolese Banyarwanda.   
Kabila, a Mulubakat, wrestled the leadership of the AFDL from the 
Banyamulenge and failed to grant them their citizenship demands.  In July 1998, 
eager to boost his fledgling political support at home, he ordered the withdrawal from 
the country of the Rwandan and Ugandan forces which had helped him seize power 
and set up a military alliance with Rwandan Hutu militiamen and former armed 
forces.  This once again created a congruence of interests between the Congolese 
Tutsi and the Kigali regime against the government in Kinshasa and led to the second 
Congolese war that began in August 1998 and is still unfolding.  As before, however, 
the Banyarwanda, acting through the RCD-Goma, embarked in the war in order to 
resist persecution, rejoin the fold of the state and improve their local status.  They 
have since pursued their reinsertion by first trying to seize military control of 
Kinshasa and, when this failed, by entering in political negotiations with the 
government, under the Lusaka Agreement framework.  To improve their local 
conditions, they have used a mix of domination of local autochthonous populations 
and re-appropriation of land assets, together with a policy of “reconciliation” and 
“dialogue” among the different communities of Kivu, whose implicit purpose is the 
recognition of the Congolese Tutsi as a bona fide local community. The organization 
of an “Inter-Kivutien dialogue” and the takeover of the so-called Barza 
intercommunity councils by the RCD have followed this logic.
108 
Both strategies have, however, failed to yield significant successes so far.  The 
Inter-Congolese Dialogue has so far left the RCD-Goma out of the government spoils.  
Meanwhile, the continuation of violence in the Kivus, principally by the Mai Mai 
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who, by and large, represent anti-Tutsi autochthonous groups, betrays the enduring 
lack of integration and acceptance of the Banyarwanda among other Congolese in the 
Kivus.  The insurgency against the RCD of a dissident Banyamulenge group in South 
Kivu since March 2002, under the leadership of a former RPF and RCD officer, 
Commandant Masunzu, reveals the extent of the RCD’s political failure on both 
fronts.  The Masunzu rebellion illustrates the eagerness of some local Banyamulenge 
to dissociate themselves from the RCD-Goma, following its failure to reach power 
and its deep unpopularity in the Kivus.  Ironically, the RCD movement, whose aim 
was to force the reintegration of Banyamulenge in the Congolese political system, has 
become a liability to the Banyamulenge.  The alliance of the RCD with Rwanda, its 
forcible implementation of pro-Tutsi policies in the East and its failure to quash local 
violence and to seize power in Kinshasa have further increased identity polarization in 
the region and made the Banyamulenge more vulnerable to violence by other groups 
than at any other time.    The vagaries of the RCD-Goma illustrate how, even in 
the intense, painfully loaded context of identity conflicts in Eastern Congo, the 
patrimonial logic of state access remains a crucial determinant of political behavior, 
which contributes to steering the Banyamulenge away from separatist and irredentist 
agendas.  The dispossession by the Congolese state of their status as participants in its 
system, a blatant case of “horizontal inequality,” has not resulted in a will to escape 
the system but rather in repeated desperate attempts to rejoin it.
109   “Transnational 
spaces” with Rwanda and the overflow of the latter’s ethnic conflict into Congo have 
created a temporary congruence of objectives but not a common identity between 
Rwandan and Congolese Tutsis.  For sure, political dynamics in Rwanda have 
changed political dynamics in Kivu, particularly as they have led to the polarization of 
Hutu and Tutsi communities among the Banyarwanda.  Yet, they have led to an 
increasingly narrow definition of political identities, and an increasingly complex 
pattern of political violence in the region, rather than to the  transnational aggregation 
of identities in a challenge to the established order. 
The weakening of the Congolese state in the 1990s and the continued denial of 
the federalist option by the Congolese ruling elites created the conditions for a rise in 
both the clientelistic and violent expressions of ethnic competition.  Despite the 
weakness of the state, however, ethnic politics in Congo has remained a struggle for 
access to the resources of power.  Identity has been instrumental in fighting for state 
resources, but has rarely conferred the fundamental motivation for political 
emancipation from the state.   
 
 
6.  Is Congo Different? 
The logic of the sovereign state as private resource triggers paradoxical outcomes in 
Congo.  In light of its institutional weakness and its social heterogeneity, Congo 
would have been expected to fall apart in the era of globalized economic and cultural 
flows. Congo betrays expectations that link the rise of local identity politics to 
globalization, as a parochial reaction to global standardization, an expression of the 
need for local closure in the face of globalized flows.
110  What Congo suggests, 
instead, is that there are alternative coalitions of global forces and domestic factors 
which promote national identities and repress local ones.   
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  How different is Congo, then, and can anything be learned from it with 
comparative relevance?  While possibly more extreme in its deviances, Congo is not 
as different from other African states as it may seem.  Young and Beissinger have 
highlighted that, compared to those of post-Soviet Eurasia, for example, African 
conflicts are generally much more about control of the state than about territorial 
control.  They muse for the whole continent when they notice that “Particularly 
striking in the large zones of disorder in contemporary Africa is the relative absence 
of ethnic self-determination.”
111  There are two prima facie explanations for this.  
First, as suggested by Beissinger and Young, few African states are based on ethno-
national project, deriving instead their national identity from territorially defined 
states.  As a result, the status of minority is rarely lived as one of domination at the 
hands of someone else’s state.  Rather, the state is neutrally defined as postcolonial 
territory and is up for grabs by any group capable of doing so.  Second, the sheer 
poverty of Africa makes state sovereignty one of the prime resources everywhere, and 
dwarfs the relative returns of alternatives to the state.  This is not necessarity true in 
more industrial countries where competing sources of revenues exist for the leaders of 
potential self-determination movements, which may affect their cost-benefit analysis 
of rebellion. 
  Furthermore, among he few actual contemporary cases of slef-proclained self-
determination movements, several belong to the realm of posturing more than to that 
of actual challenge of the state.  Barotseland secessionists in Zambia, or Casamance 
separatists in Senegal no longer truly harbor ambitions of breaking away from the 
state but maintain this discourse as part of their strategies of renegotiating their 
allegiance to the state or as the justifying discourse of mostly criminal---and no longer 
political--- activities. 
  Most cases of political violence in Africa are therefore by and large consistent 
with the Congolese story.  Neither the Liberian nor the Sierra Leonean wars, for 
example, resulted in self-determination movements, pitting instead factions for control 
of the state. 
The only clear-cut cases of self-determination in Sub-Saharan Africa are a 
handful:  Eritrea, Somaliland, Southern Sudan.  They suggest that challenges to the 
postcolonial African social contract may take place either when there is a historical 
claim for separate colonial existence (as in Eritrea or Somaliland),
112 where there are 
reinforcing cleavages that magnify grievances and truly create a sense of minority at 
risk (as is the case in Southern Sudan where race, religion and resource distribution 
overlap), or where culturally specific diasporas reproduce and crystallize sub-national 
identities and provide the means for their local political expression (as is the case with 
Somaliland, or Sri Lank outside of Africa).  In other circumsntances, the Congolese 
model, for all its paradoxical idiosyncracies, may well provide the blueprint of the 
stifling of self-determination in Africa.   
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